INTEREST

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FOR YOU

Priestly, scholarly, and Franciscan—these are the characteristics which we try to achieve in each issue of INTEREST. No easy thing to accomplish in a publication, they are yet more difficult to fulfill in the larger dimensions of one's personal life. We count ourselves fortunate and privileged, then, in having studied under a professor in whom these characteristics took on vital reality, Fr. Victor Mills, O.F.M., our late professor of Church History. It is to his beloved memory that we dedicate this issue of INTEREST. Fr. Victor died on January 22nd of this year, two months after receiving the highest degree the Order of Friars Minor confers on a professor, the coveted *Lector Jubilatus*. In this spirit of reverent dedication we also wish to express our appreciation to our professors on the faculty of Holy Name College, and indeed to our superiors in Holy Name Province, whose scholarly zeal and encouragement enable us to communicate with you.



FR. VICTOR MILLS, O.F.M.

This issue contains a history of Cardinal Cisneros, the 16th Century Franciscan who played a key role in the Spanish Theological Renaissance. A penerating study of the Primacy of Christ in *Colossians* is geared to give the Scriptural basis for Franciscan Christocentrism. We feel a concrete expression of this view is given to technology and theology, dealt with *In Our Tradition*. A Marian paper on the fundamental principle of Mariology will give a thorough view of contemporary thought. Finally, a treatment of moral questions in alcoholism rounds out this issue of INTEREST, an issue we hope you will find priestly, scholarly and Franciscan.

Thank you,

The Editors.

IN OUR TRADITION...

by LUKE R. POWER, O.F.M.

In an age which prides itself on progress in science and technology, men are beginning to realize that the true meaning of this progress can be found only by re-examining the ancient sources of wisdom. In a real sense, the world in which we live is in ferment; a new world is unfolding. A scientific and technological revolution is reshaping nations and civilizations. Archibald MacLeash, writing recently in the *New York Times* (Dec. 25, 1960), calls it: ". . . the revolution of knowledge which, by changing what we know about the universe, is changing the universe we know." Industrialized societies seek a more sophisticated application of science as a means of stimulating social and economic progress. It is progress which is having serious and far reaching repercussions on the individual, social, and cultural lives of men.

As in every area of human achievement, there is danger. Pope Pius XII described the core of this danger as the "technological spirit" in his 1953 Christmas Message:

> In what exactly does this spirit consist? In this, that what is most highly prized in human life is the advantage that can be drawn from the forces and elements of nature; whatever is technically possible in mechanical production takes precedence over all other forms of human activity, and the perfection of earthly culture and happiness is seen in it.

It is this spirit which focuses the interests and hope of men almost exclusively upon the material world. Qualitative moral judgments are dulled in those who measure progress in quantitative value. A narrowing view of reality and an expanding reliance upon science has produced the aberration that science and technology can produce adequate answers to the age old questions: Who am I? Where am I going? It is but a short jump from this delusion to the complete abandonment of God.

And yet, it is in this increasingly complex technological era that men must live and work out their salvation. Because this is so, we must ask: Is technology only a hopeless dehumanizing threat to our Christian tradition? Is it ultimately an antagonist of our theology and our religion? Or can it be reconciled with the temporal and supra-temporal ends for men and creatures in God's design? Emmanuel Cardinal Suhard, writing in *Priests Among Men* gave what might very well serve as the key-note to a Christian answer:

> Modern inventions which have increased at an ever growing pace cannot be for the Christian just another news item or a mere scientific curiosity. They have their value as pointers and they must henceforth be integrated in the Christian's apostolic vision of Redemption. For they are something more than empty symbols, they are making a new universe. And this is the universe we are called upon to save (p. 219).

The symbol of our development may be the transfer machine or the computer but these are merely the tools of our age. The real problem of this development is centered in human beings and not in the scientific or technological sphere. The forces which science and technology have unleashed have no direction within themselves. Rather, these forces have a dual potentiality for they are capable of being directed to good or bent to evil.

Everything in the Church is designed to impregnate a spiritual character into such development; to give the Christian a more profound knowledge and direction that is necessitated by his world. This guidance must be present, otherwise a spirit of materialism will assert itself, and man will become the creator-slave of the power and technical achievement he worked so mightily to attain. The Church is more than aware of this modern exigency, for Cardinal Tardini recently ascribed the need to inform and instruct Catholics concerning technology as one of the reasons for the impending ecumenical council.

What is required is a Christian interpretation of man in an age that is heir to the accumulated techniques developed thus far. A Christian society for our time has to accept the scientific milieu and transform it with its own spirit. To fulfill this function for society, the theologian must correlate everything that is discovered about the world and man into his theological world-view. Saint Justin once told us that all truth, no matter where it comes from, belongs to us as Christians.

We can accord recognition to modern science and its body of knowledge for still another reason: it has its origins within the culture of the Christian West. Cardinal Ruffini has pointed out that it was Christianity alone which furnished the very environment of freedom necessary before science and technology might evolve, for it alone provided the necessary attitude toward the world of nature. Moreover, A. N. Whitehead points out in his book, *Science and the Modern World,* that science's presuppositions are founded on the Christian belief in the orderliness of the universe:

> The Middle Ages formed one long training of the intellect of Western Europe in the sense of order . . . it needs but a sentence to point out how the habit of definite, exact thought was implanted in the European mind by the long dominance of scholastic logic and scholastic divinity. . . . The greatest contribution of medievalism to the formation of the scientific movement was the inexpugnable belief that every detailed occurrence can be correlated with its antecedents in a perfectly definite manner, exemplifying general principles. Without this belief the incredible labours of scientists would be without hope (p. 19).

Thus having always defended the bond between man and nature, Christianity can and must integrate the contributions of science into a total intelligibility of God's universe. Theology, taking into account this knowledge, thus maintains its time honored place as *Queen of the Sciences.*

Today, many theological writers *are* concerning themselves with the eschatological as well as the his-

torical and concrete implications of science and technology. Although a theology of technology has not yet been completely elaborated, a portion of our Franciscan heritage—Saint Francis' attitude towards creatures—strongly suggests itself as a basic framework orienting theology for this problem of our age.

Is it naive to propose the simple thought of Medieval Francis as an insight for the complex issues of our age? Yet, it took the genius of a Bonaventure and a Scotus to *begin* to elucidate the profound implications in the spirit of Saint Francis. We here propose a further consideration of these implications which are relative for the problems of today.

The attitude of Francis was radically *Christian,* essentially religious, and therefore fundamentally optimistic. He had the gift of unifying in one dynamic view —God, men, and all creation. God was the center of all to Francis, the Supreme Being, the Lord of Creation and Goodness Himself. To Him, in Whom all things live and move and have their being, Francis abandoned himself with a genuine dependence upon His Providence. Having so sought and embraced God, having abandoned all else for His sake, Francis merited to discover all things anew.



Because he was given a special insight into material things, Francis could see that God's self-diffusive goodness communicated itself in all ways, even into the finite order. The Divine Goodness was for him the explanation of creation. God willed all that was created, and in willing it, the entire order of creation was orientated to return glory to Him.

Francis was not a lover of nature in a sentimental, pantheistic sense. Rather, it was his reverence for God that was communicated to creatures, for he saw in each of them the vestige of their creator. In themselves they were good; perfect in their nature and in the laws that governed their development. Each thing, giving glory to God not only by being but also by becoming what it was intended to be, drew from Francis a response proportionate to its inherent dignity.

Francis, however, was also aware that man works out his salvation by using material things, and he understood that part of the value of a creature was its capacity for use by men. This is apparent in the constant acknowledgement he gave to creatures for their help in his climb to God. *The Words of Saint Francis,* edited by James Meyer, O. F. M., quotes part of his reason for composing the "Canticle of Brother Sun:"

> For His praise, therefore, and for our consolation and the edification of our neighbor, I want to compose a new hymn about the Lord's creatures, of which we make daily use, without which we cannot live, and with which the human race greatly offends its Creator (p. 232).

Realizing that men have the dual capacity to misuse and debase created things as instruments of evil, or to consecrate and develop them, he could never make these material things ends in themselves, for that would have been an irreverent abuse of their goodness. Thus it was that Francis felt a fellowship with each creature, for every tree and every rock was the progeny of the same Creator Who had created him.

In the spirit of St. Francis, with his appreciation of creation and man's dominion over it, we can view technology as a *gift of God.* This is not really a new thought, for the idea that the state of man could be improved materially and spiritually has deep roots in Christian tradition. It is expressed in *Isaias*: "Behold, I have created the smith that blows in the fire the coals and brings forth an instrument for his work" (54:16). St. Thomas acknowledges it when he states in the *Summa Theologica*: "In the state of corrupt nature man can indeed achieve some particular good by the power of his own nature, as for example, the building of houses, the planting of vineyards, and things of this kind" (I^a,II^{ae}, 109, 2).

Now, armed with that pervading reference which Francis had for material things and their potentialities, man can understandingly exercise his prerogative to perfect creation. Since man was created with an ability to develop those potentialities, it is proper that he do so, for it is *an aspect of reverence* to see seminal possibilities mature in the creation of God. Such a spirit, drawing out the hidden forces of nature with the tools of technology, can be instrumental in drawing men closer to God and at the same time can give glory to God by the positive transformation of matter. Francis could see that to make the earth bear fruit was to share in the act of creation and to render formal glory to God. In the "Canticle of Brother Sun" he sang:

> Be praised, O Lord, through our Sister
> Mother Earth,
> For she sustains and guides our life,
> And yields us divers fruits, with tinted
> flowers and grass.

It is certain then that if he could praise God because the earth yielded its fruit, he would also say that to take the ore from the earth and to process steel from it, was also a godly act.

Rather than being fearful for his fate in a technological society, the man of faith can share a true Christian optimism, since the development of God's creation can be a means to recapitulate all things in Christ. This optimism is underscored by Bishop John J. Wright who, taking note of man's new vantage at the frontier of space, anticipates that the departure of man and his machine from the very earth itself is bound to have a profound influence on human thought. In *Ave Maria* (Apr.5,'58) he spoke of the tendency of modern sci-

Cont'd on pg. 30

THE PRIMACY OF CHRIST IN COLOSSIANS I

by MICHAEL D. MEILACH, O.F.M.

13: [God] has transferred us into the kingdom of His beloved Son.

14: in whom we have our redemption, the remission of sins;

15: who is an image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation,

16: for in Him were created all things in the heavens and on the earth, things visible and things invisible, whether Thrones, or Dominations, or Principalities, or Powers; all things have been created through and for Him;

17: and He is before all things, and in Him all things hold together.

18: And He is the head of the body, the church, who is the beginning, the firstborn from the dead, that in all things He may have the first place.

19: For in Him all the fullness [of the Godhead] was pleased to dwell,

20: and through Him to reconcile towards Him all things, whether on the earth or in the heavens, making peace through the blood of His cross.[1]

This passage of St. Paul's Letter to the Colossians lays the foundation for the doctrine of the primacy of Christ, a doctrine which H. M. Féret, O.P., has called "a datum of faith prior to every particular theology and imposing itself on it."[2]

We believe that this teaching of St. Paul can be reduced to this: The beloved of God (v. 13) is the

the firstborn of all creation (v. 15), for all things have been made in, through, and for Him (v. 16), that in all things He may have the first place (v. 18).

It seems permissible, moreover, to translate this formal and explicit teaching of the Apostle into theological language thus: The Word precisely as incarnate (v. 13) enjoys an absolute primacy (v. 18) as the firstborn of all creation (v. 15), in virtue of which He is the secondary exemplary, efficient, and final cause of all the rest of creation (v. 16).

To determine whether this is indeed the formal teaching of St. Paul, we shall examine the following points in separate sections of the present article. First, does this passage treat of the Word as uncreated, or as incarnate? Second, what have causal relationships to do with the order of the universe—specifically, with the order described by St. Paul in Col. 1:16: all things have been made in, through, and for Christ? Third, what light can the individual prepositions *in, through,* and *for* shed on the nature of the causal bond between Christ and other creatures? Finally, how does the permission for sin fit into the picture?

I. THE SUBJECT OF COLOSSIANS 1:13-20

St. Paul opens the passage with the statement that God has "transferred us into the kingdom of His beloved Son." Now, the Son of God is none other than the Word, the Second Person of the Trinity. But the Word can be considered either as uncreated or as incarnate; we are trying to determine here which way St. Paul refers to Him.

Why do we raise this question? Because if St. Paul is referring to the Word as uncreated in vv. 15-17,[3] he is merely pointing out God's superiority over the angels, toward whom the Colossians were paying an exaggerated worship. But if the entire passage, including these three all-important verses, refers to the Word as incarnate, then St. Paul is doing much more than asserting God's supremacy; he is also showing the central importance of the Incarnation in the divine plan. That is, he is giving the Incarnation a privileged place in God's plan for creation and saying that all things were made in view of the Incarnation—"in, through, and for" the Incarnate Word.

Some eminent commentators, as we just implied, hold the former position: that at least vv. 15-17 refer to the Word as uncreated.[4] But these commentators give no reason for their stand; they seem to assume that St. Paul cannot be referrring to the Word as incarnate. On the other hand, we believe that St. Paul does refer to Christ as Man in this entire passage. We should like to point out, in support of our position, three considerations based on the text itself and two observations based on the historical and literal contexts.

First, St. Paul himself identifies the "beloved Son" of v. 13 as Him "in whom we have our redemption, the remission of our sins" (v. 14). Now, the Word as uncreated cannot accurately be called our Redeemer. *Christ* is our Redeemer, and Christ, properly speaking, did not exist before the Incarnation. When we speak of the Savior, the Redeemer, Jesus, or Christ, we necessarily refer to the concrete Person of the Word in possession of both the divine and the human natures.

In the second place, St. Paul calls Christ an "image of the invisible God."[5] But as the uncreated Word, Christ would not be simply *an* image of the *Godhead;* He would be *the* image of the *Father.* Besides, the word *invisible* used with *God* seems to imply the counterpart *visible* with *image;* for if the image is invisible too, there appears to be no reason for using the word *invisible* with *God.* Marcellus of Ancyra gave a clear explanation of this point when he wrote that the Word first became an image of the invisible God when He assumed human flesh.[6]

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[1] Col. 1:13-20. Using the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine translation as a guide, we have supplied our own translation of this passage from the Greek of F. Brandscheid's *Novum Testamentum Gr. et Lat.* (3rd ed., Friburg-im-B.: Herder, 1907), p. 432. Significant changes will be explained in their proper place.

[2] H. M. Féret, O.P., "Creati in Christo Jesu," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* (1941-42), pp. 96-132.

[3] This is the opinion, e.g., of Cornelius a Lapide, *In Ep. ad Col.* (2nd ed., Turin: Marietti, 1930), vol. 2, p. 471.

[4] Besides Cornelius a Lapide *(ibid.),* see St .Thomas Aquinas, *In Omnes S. Pauli Apostoli Epistolas* (7th ed., Turin: Marietti, 1929), pp. 119-20; Bernardine a Piconio, *An Exposition of the Epistles of St. Paul* (tr. A. H. Prichard; London: Hodges, 1890), pp. 382-83; F. Prat, S.J., *The Theology of St. Paul* (tr. J. L. Stoddard; London: Burns, Oates, Washbourne, 1934), vol. 1, pp. 288-91; J. MacEvilly, D.D., *Exposition of the Epistles of St. Paul* (7th ed., Dublin: Gill, 1910), vol. 2, p. 32; W. Estius, *In Ep. Apost.* (Louvain: Michel, N.D.), vol. 7, pp. 2646-53; F. C. Ceulemans, *In Ep. S. Pauli* (Mechlin: Dessain, 1902), pp. 83-86. These commentators refer invariably to the Arian dispute, in which orthodox writers took great pains to vindicate Christ's divinity, basing their arguments on Col. 1:15. Estius alone, however, seems to have taken the trouble to admit the validity of the opposite opinion: "Porro quidam expositores primogenitum omnis creaturae Christum interpretantur secundum naturam humanam: vel, quod secundum eam fit omnibus aliis creaturis excellentior; quomodo primogenitus ceteris filiis anteponi solet"—*loc. cit.,* p. 2648.

[5] V. 15. We use the indefinite article because the Greek has no article and the definite article is not required by the context as it is with *firstborn.* There could conceivably be another image of the invisible God if the Holy Ghost were to become incarnate—and, *de facto,* we are also created in the image of God, although we are far less perfect reflections of God's perfections than Christ is. *Firstborn,* on the other hand, absolutely requires the definite article, even though it is not found in the Greek, because there can be only one firstborn of a given collectivity (herd, flock, family, creation, etc.).

[6] "Nunc patet, quod tunc primum cum carnem assumpsit, factum in imaginem Dei, vere imago fiebat invisibilis Dei"—Marcellus of Ancyra, cited by Eusebius of Caesarea, *Contra Marc., lib.* II, *c.* 3 (*P.G.* 24, 807). We cite Marcellus not because his work is a model of Catholic Christology, but because this particular explanation is so clear. Moreover, it reflects a strong tradition; cf., e.g., Tertullian, *Adv. Marcionem, lib.* V, *c.* 19 (*P.L.* 2, 519); Origen, *In. Joh.,* VI, *n.* 2 (*P.G.* 14, 203). See also, on this question, D. Petavius, *De Trin., lib.* VIII, *c.* 2, *n.* 9 (*Dogmata theologica* [2nd ed., Paris: Vivès, 1865], vol. 3, p. 439); and M. J. Lagrange, O.P., *Epître aux Romains* (Paris: Lecoffre, 1931), p. 216.

And third, in the same verse (15) St. Paul calls Christ the "firstborn of all creation." *Firstborn* was a technical term in the Hebrew Law, which provided that the firstborn of the family or flock was to be offered to God and either redeemed or sacrificed.[7] For the metaphor to have any meaning to his contemporaries, therefore, St. Paul must have meant something created when he spoke of the firstborn of all creation. Just as the firstborn of the flock or herd was of the same nature as the rest of the animals—i.e., a lamb from a flock or a calf from a herd, so the "firstborn of all creation" must partake of the nature of the rest of creation—be a creature. There is another reason, too, why St. Paul could not have called the uncreated Word, as such, the firstborn of all creation: the Word has the same relationship to creation as the Father and the Holy Spirit. Neither as a unit nor singly, then, can the divine Persons be referred to as the "firstborn of all creation."

Many witnesses to Catholic Tradition, moreover, carefully distinguish the term *firstborn* (*primogenitus*) from its counterpart, *only-begotten* (*unigenitus*); St. Augustine, for example, says that the former term applies to Christ as Man, as in Rom. 8:29, whereas the latter applies to the Word as such, as in Jn. 1:1.[8]

The historical context likewise points to the conclusion that the Word as incarnate is the subject of this passage; for St. Paul was writing to Christians who considered the angels intermediate spirits between God and creation—Platonic demiurges, as it were. He had no particular reason to insist on God's supremacy over the various kinds of angels(v. 16), because the Colossians were making intermediate creatures—not gods—out of these spirits. As Huby so well puts it, "The false teachers were interposing between God and man hierarchies of angels as instruments of mediation and objects of cult, to the detriment of the unique mediation of Christ and of His sovereign primacy."[9] St. Paul, wishing to correct this error which compromised the central importance of the Incarnation, does so by insisting not merely that God intended Jesus Christ to be the sole Mediator between God and men (cf. 1 Tim. 2:5), but also, as we shall see, that God created all things "in, through, and for" the Incarnate Word.

The literal context leads us to believe that the entire passage without exception refers to the Word as incarnate, because the passage begins and ends with statements involving Christ's human nature[10] and because there is no evidence of a transition anywhere in the passage: the same subject is retained throughout, as we see from the prononuns *ós* and *autós*. Comparing this passage with Jn. 1:1-14, we see this important difference: St. John explicitly begins his Prologue with a statement relative to the eternity of the Word as such, and only gradually, in the course of a chronological narrative, approaches the subject of the Incarnation. With St. Paul, however, there is no evidence of such a development; he opens with an explicit mention of the Redemption, goes on to exalt the Redeemer, and closes with the same theme—the blood of Christ's cross.



For these reasons, then, we conclude that the "beloved Son" of vv. 13-20 is the Word precisely as incarnate.

II. THE RELEVANCE OF CAUSALITY TO ST. PAUL'S INTENTION

We have just seen the literal meaning of the title *firstborn*: the first and finest offspring of a homogeneous group of animals, or the first son to be born in a family. But why does St. Paul apply it to Christ? Christ was not the first creature from the temporal viewpoint; in fact He appeared on the scene quite late in history. Recalling the Colossians' error, however, we realize that St. Paul is using the title as a metaphor to express Christ's pre-eminence over the rest of creation.

Quite significantly, the next verse (16) begins with the causal conjunction *for* (*óti*). This fact makes it clear that St. Paul wishes to elaborate on the pre-eminence he has just attributed to Christ—i.e., to the Word precisely as incarnate, and hence to the Incarnation in the divine plan.

To elaborate on the privileged position he accords Christ in v. 15, St. Paul would express the *order* existing between Christ and the rest of creation. And to express this order, he might choose from three courses: (1) he could use another metaphor like *firstborn;* (2) he could set up a temporal or spatial analogy and say that Christ is "before" or "higher" than everything else (cf. v. 17); or (3) he could state the truth literally and give the precise causal relationships between the Incarnate Word and the rest of creation.

An examination of v. 16 seems to show that St. Paul has chosen the third course. True, he was no metaphysician and never studied Aristotle, but the language he uses is not that of the philosopher; it is the language of the layman, the ordinary terminology of everyday conversation. For the human intellect (and Paul's was certainly one of the finest minds the world has known) is equipped with a sort of natural, pre-philosophical metaphysics which it expresses in common, ordinary language. Thus St. Paul could say that all things were "made for Christ" and mean exactly the same thing St. Thomas would mean by calling Christ the "final cause for all creation." Indeed, if St. Paul is elaborating on Christ's pre-eminence, he must be appealing to some causal relationship to do so.

Why a causal relationship? Because the beings of the universe are related precisely in this way—as cause to effect. As St. Thomas so well expressed it, the parts of

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[7] Ex. 22:29-30; Num. 18:15. We prefer the translation "firstborn of all creation" to "firstborn of every creature" because *firstborn* requires a collective complement. True, *every creature* can be understood collectively, but unlike *all creation,* it also admits of a distributive sense, which would yield the unacceptable rendition of Knox: "His is that first birth which precedes every act of creation." To avoid ambiguity, then, we use the translation *all creation.* For similar metaphorical uses of *firstborn,* see Heb. 1:6; Apoc. 1:5; Rom. 8:29; Col. 1:18; also note St. Paul's substitution of the equivalent legal term *first-fruits* in 1 Cor. 15:20, 23.

[8] St. Augustine, *Contra Secundinum Manich., c.* 5 (*P.L.* 42, 581); for many other witnesses to this tradition, see J. F. Bonnefoy, O.F.M., *La primauté du Christ selon l'Ecriture et la Tradition* (Rome: Herder, 1959), pp. 188-203.

[9] J. Huby, "Epistle to the Colossians," *Guide to the Bible* (2nd ed., Tricot-Robert, tr. Arbez-McGuire; Tournai: Desclée, 1951), vol. 1, p. 246.

[10] In v. 14, we read, "in whom we have our redemption, the remission of our sins"; v. 18 speaks of Christ as the "head of the body, the church" (this translation is more literal than that of the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine, "head of His body, the Church," but it has the same meaning); and v. 20 mentions the "blood of His cross."

the universe are ordered to one another insofar as one acts upon the other (efficient causality), is the model for the other (exemplary causality), and is the end of the other (final causality).[11] There seems to be no other way, in fact, to describe dependence between two beings. These three relationships of maker to made, model to copy, and end to means cover all possible cases.

It is quite meaningful and accurate, therefore, to say that *God* can be described as the primary efficient, final, and exemplary cause of all creation, for this statement means that God made everything, made it all for Himself, and patterned it all after His own perfections. (We make no distinction between the Persons here, for the Three work as one *ad extra.*)

But in addition to God's primary causality, we know that there are secondary causal influences exerted by creatures on one another and that the nobler is always the cause of the less noble in a given order.[12] The higher a being is in the scale of creation, in fact, the more extensively it participates in the universal causal influence of the Godhead, for *agere sequitur esse;* a being's activity is commensurate with its degree of being.

What has all this to do with St. Paul's passage in Colossians? It has a good deal to do with it, because it tells us that if St. Paul wants to express the unique order existing between Christ, the noblest of all creatures, and the rest of creation, a most effective way for him to do so would be to show that Christ in His Sacred Humanity is, second to God, the maker, the model, and the end of all other creatures—in other words, that Christ is the *universal* secondary exemplary, efficient, and final cause of creation.

III. THE THREE CAUSALTIES OF CHRIST CONSIDERED SEPARATELY

The metaphysical speculations of the preceding section are ours, of course, and not St. Paul's. Yet we believe that, although the Apostle did not perform this explicitly metaphysical reasoning before setting out to exalt Christ in the eyes of the Colossians, he did see the general, pre-philosophical truth it involves. For Christ is the noblest of all beings which can still be considered a part of creation, and Paul might well have realized, even without a specific divine revelation, that what gives Christ this dignity is a perfection (exemplary causality), influence (efficient causality), and importance (final causality) second only to those of the Godhead.

It is our position, then, that the three prepositions of v. 16—*in, through* and *for*—denote these three distinct kinds of causality, and that all three of these are secondary causalities predicated of Christ as Man. We will attempt in this present section to show that these are the precise meanings of the prepositions quite apart from any prior appeal to Tradition or to metaphysics, both of which bear them out.

A. The Secondary Exemplary Causality of Christ

The first preposition St. Paul uses in v. 16 is *in* (*en*): ". . . in Him were created all things. . . ." What might this *in* mean?

According to the Bauer *Lexicon of the New Testament,* this word *en* can have several meanings in Koine Greek; its meaning in a given case must, of course, be determined from the context in which it is used. In its basic, etymological sense, the word denotes location—place in which. In St. Paul, however, it is most frequently used in a transferred sense to denote the close relationship existing between Christians and God or Christ.[13]

In the present case, of course, *en* does not have its etymological sense of place in which, because such a sense is precluded by the context; all things were not created "in" Christ as in a container.

The second sense, however, seems quite admissible; i.e., St. Paul could very likely have used the word *en* here, as in many other instances, to stress the close relationship between "all things" and Christ. But whereas this relationship is often left undefined by commentators, we think that the basic etymological sense of *en* gives a clue to its precise meaning: it seems to lend some sort of *local* aspect to the relationship in question, so that something possessed by all creatures is somehow "in Christ"—so that, as St. Thomas says, "all things have been made in Him as in a certain exemplar."[14] The word *en,* then, expresses a relationship of exemplary causality; all the perfections found in all created natures are found in a perfect way in Christ, the model of all creation.

But St. Thomas, who is cited by Leahy,[15] is referring to Christ as the Word when he calls Him the exemplar of all things. We, on the other hand, believe we can show, in conformity with the conclusions reached in our first section, how the Incarnate Word, precisely as incarnate, can claim a *secondary* exemplarity in relation to the rest of creation.

Looking at Christ's human nature, we note that it is the most perfect of all created natures. It contains every grade of perfection, from angelic spirituality down to the minimal perfection found in the lowliest mineral salt. And all these perfections are in Christ's human nature in a super-eminent way, since it is hypostatically united to the Person of the Word.

Another consideration which we feel points to the secondary causality of the Incarnate Word, rather than the primary causality of the triune Godhead, is St. Paul's use of the word through (*diá*) at the end of v. 16 to express efficient causality. *Diá* is the perfect term to express the secondary causality of Christ, as we shall see, but it appears to be a poor substitute indeed for the far stronger word *by* or *from* (*ek*) which St. Paul uses elsewhere to express the primary efficient causality of the Godhead. We shall discuss the efficient causality of Christ in a moment, however; for now let us conclude briefly that the text and the context both seem to point to Christ's secondary exemplarity as the best meaning for the *in* of v. 16.

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[11] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae,* I, 48, 1, *ad* 5 (Ottawa, 1941; vol. 1, p. 304b).

[12] *Ibid.,* I, 65, 3 (p. 398); III, 56, 1, *ad* 3 and *c.* (vol. 4, pp. 2788a, 2787a).

[13] W. Bauer, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament* (4th ed., tr. and adapted by W. F. Arndt and F. W. Gingrich; Chicago; Chicago U. Press, 1952), p. 258; cf. especially Eph. 1:4; 2:6,7.

[14] St. Thomas Aquinas, "Super Ep. S. Pauli Ap. ad Col.," *c.* 1, *lect.* 4 (*loc. cit.,* note 4, above, p. 120).

[15] D. J. Leahy, "The Epistle to the Colossians," *A Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture* (London: Nelson, 1953), p. 1134.

B. The Secondary Efficient (Meritorious) Causality of Christ

At the end of this 16th verse, St. Paul tells us that all things have been created "through" (*diá*) Christ. Once again we find a common, ordinary expression being used to indicate a precise relationship; but what is this relationship? It should be one of causality, because it expresses an order between Christ and the rest of creation—and order results from causal relationships.

It seems possible, even a priori, to say that this *through* refers to some sort of efficient causality, because the *in* at the beginning of the verse refers to exemplary causality (as we have just seen) and the *for* at the end of the same verse refers to final causality (as we shall see shortly), so that efficient causality is the only one remaining.

Thus Cornelius a Lapide cites St. Anselm's explanation that "through Him as through an efficient cause with the Father all things were created."[16] But the eminent Jesuit exegete goes on to say, without proving the point, that this "as it were mediate operation is *attributed* to the Son, who proceeds from the Father"[17]—i.e., to the Word as such. Thus he follows St. Thomas, who also understands Col. 1:16 as referring to the primary causality of the Godhead, rather than to Christ's secondary causality. But this transfer of meaning seems unwarranted because of the context; as we have seen, the Word precisely as incarnate is the subject of the entire passage.

This distinction between primary and secondary causality—between *by* or *from* (*ek*) and *through* (*diá*) is given by St. Paul himself in 1 Cor. 8:6: ". . . for us there is only one God, the Father from (*ek*) whom are all things . . . and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through (*diá*) whom are all things. . . ." M. J. Lagrange, O.P., gives a most enlightening commentary on this verse of 1 Cor., when he observes that we find the same preposition here, *diá,* that we find in Col. 1:16—used to express the same activity which must be *distinguished* from that of God Himself and yet is exercised upon *all things.*[18]

And St. Paul uses the same preposition a third time in Heb. 1:2, where he tells us that Christ is the "appointed heir of all things, through whom also [God] made the world." The Word as such has exactly the same absolute power over the universe as do the Father and the Holy Spirit, however, and so He cannot inherit it or even be appointed as its heir.

A careful consideration of the word *through* leads us to conclude that some kind of secondary activity is involved. When I say, for example, that I sent my package to a friend through another person, I imply that this other person took part in the transmission of the package. Nor is there any question that St. Paul did not use the word many times with this meaning.[19]

But just what kind of activity is St. Paul attributing to Christ? He does not say in this verse, but he gives us a good indication later on, in v. 20, where he says that God was pleased to reconcile towards Christ "all things, whether on the earth or in the heavens . . . *through the blood of His cross.*"[20] Indeed, we know that everything our Lord did during His life on earth was meritorious—in particular, His Passion and death. It is by His *merits,* then, that Christ makes His influence felt. It is by His *merits* that He obtains for all creatures their existence and, in the case of rational creatures, their supernatural gifts of grace and glory.

The difficulty we experience in trying to understand this efficient casualty-by-merit stems from our human tendency to picture Christ as being present on the day of creation and being used as an instrument by the Creator. But this is not the kind of activity Christ performed; Christ was the meritorious, not the instrumental cause of creation. Christ was not present at the creation of the world, but His foreseen merits were taken into account. Indeed, God, to whom all things are eternally present, had, strictly speaking, no need to "foresee" those merits. He was able, even at the dawn of creation, to take into consideration merits which from our human standpoint did not "yet" exist. Just as He preserved Mary from sin through the "foreseen merits" of Christ, so He was able to create all things from the beginning through those same "foreseen merits."

What does it mean, though, to say that Christ "merited" the creation of the world? It means that by His own meritorious *activity,* the Incarnate Word made it "worth God's while" to create the world. How? By insuring that Christ would sum it all up in Himself (Eph. 1:10) and use it to give God perfect glory. It is this *activity* that St. Paul alludes to when he says that all things have been made "through" Christ. Christ is an "efficient cause" because He *does* something; He gives God such perfect glory through his meritorious life, Passion, and death, that God sees fit to create the rest of the Universe for Him.

Naturally St. Paul does not specifiy that Christ's influence on creation is a meritorious form of efficient causality, because he is not a metaphysician. But as we have seen, he does seem to express this very idea in equivalent terms in v. 20.

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[16] Cornelius a Lapide (*loc. cit.,* note 4, above), p. 471a.

[17] *Ibid.;* emphasis added.

[18] M. J. Lagrange, O.P., *L'Evangile selon saint Jean* (3rd ed., Paris: Lecoffre, 1927), p. 30; emphasis added.

[19] See, e.g., Gal. 1:1; 3:19; Heb. 2:2; Rom. 2:16; etc.

[20] With regard to the translation "reconcile towards Him all things" (which we prefer to the Confraternity's "reconcile to himself all things"), we offer the following explanation. Many exegetes, supposing that St. Paul refers to the restoration of a ruptured bond of friendship between God and creatures (e.g., Médebielle, "Epître aux Colossiens," *La Sainte Bible* [ed. Pirot-Blamer; Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1946], p. 111), interpret the *eis autón* of v. 20 (which the Vg. renders correctly in this case by *in ipsum*) as a hebraism for the reflexive *eautô.* But then these exegetes have difficulty explaining the verse (see the comment of Knabenbauer, *In S. Pauli Ep.* [Paris: Lethellieux, 1912], p. 303), for "all things whether on the earth or in the heavens" have not been and cannot be "restored" in this way to God's friendship. The good angels have no need of such a reconciliation, the evil ones will never be granted one, and material creation cannot experience one. The Bauer *Lexicon* (note 13, above), on p. 92, gives two meanings for the Greek *apokatallásso (reconcile),* both with reference to this precise verse, Col. 1:20. In the physical sense, which the *Lexicon* gives first, it means "to unite," and does not presuppose a prior estrangement. In the second, moral, sense, it means to restore a good relationship. Taking the first meaning for Col. 1:20, we see that the verse means this: "The universe is to form a unity, which has its goal in Christ" *(ibid.).* It seems to us, moreover, that this interpretation, given, e.g., by Estius (*loc. cit.,* note 4, above), p. 2653, better respects the literal meaning of *eis autón.* Why postulate a hebraism gratuitously, when such a postulation causes insuperable difficulties and retaining the literal sense of *eis autón* causes none? Besides, St. Paul has been using the word *autós* all through the preceding verses for this very purpose, to refer to Christ.

C. The Secondary Final Causality of Christ

Col. 1:16 ends with the affirmation that all things have been made "for" (*eis*) Christ. The Koine Greek often interchanges *en* with the dative and *eis* with the accusative, as we know—a fact which explains the Vulgate translation of the phrase *eis autón* by *in ipso*. We agree with Cornelius a Lapide, however, when he explains that the Vulgate translation is erroneous,[21] and apparently the modern translators of the Bible are all likewise agreed on this point, because the phrase is always rendered "unto" or "for" Him, rather than "in" Him. Indeed, St. Paul himself gives us innumerable instances of this usage of *eis* with the accusative to indicate movement toward a goal or, by metaphor, final causality.[22] While it is possible that St. Paul may have simply repeated his assertion at the beginning of v. 16 (*en autô*) it is this apparently gratuitous assumption which we feel must be proved, rather than the common interpretation given, e.g., by Knabenbauer in this paraphrase of the verse: "Towards Him, as towards a goal, all things converge, are directed." [23]

But here, as with the other two prepositions, many commentators hold that St. Paul is referring to God's primary causality, rather than Christ's secondary causality.[24] On the contrary, we believe that this *eis autón* refers to the secondary causality of the Incarnate Word. Our position seems to be supported by St. Paul's own description of the hierarchy of creation: "All are yours—and you are Christ's, and Christ is God's" (1 Cor. 3:22-23).

This final causality of Christ is at once the most important of the three and the easiest to understand. It is the most important because the final cause, as the Scholastics used to say, is the "cause of causes." It is superior to and, in a sense, includes the other two types of causes.[25] And it is the easiest to understand because we know from experience that the end is always nobler than the means to that end. The marble used by Michaelangelo, for example, was a means to produce the finished statue of David. The wood used by the builder is a means to build the finished house. The money earned by the worker is a means to provide for his family and lead a successful life. These are but a few examples which illustrate the universally valid principle that the end is always more important, more noble, than the means to that end.[26]

Now to reverse this natural order of things is a perversion which may occasionally be found in human beings, as when a miser makes all else serve his love for money, which is a mere means. But who would attribute such a perversion to an all-wise, all-powerful God, who disposes all things with order?[27] Therefore, since Christ is the King of the universe—since His human nature is the noblest of all the effects God has produced *ad extra,* His Incarnation cannot be a means to any end except the ultimate end of all God's works—His own glory. On the contrary, the Incarnate Word, considered precisely as such, is the proximate end of all the rest of creation, including the permission for sin, which we shall discuss in greater detail in the final section of this article.[28]

Eph. 1:4-5 sheds additional light on Christ's universal finality by telling us that God chose us in Christ "before the foundation of the world . . . to be adopted through Jesus Christ as His sons." But the natural order was willed for the supernatural, according to the axiom used, e.g., by St. Thomas,[29] and the cause of the cause is the cause also of the effect. Therefore, since Christ is the final cause of our justification,[30] He is also the final cause of our creation and, *a fortiori,* of material creation.

IV. COROLLARY: SIN, SUFFERING, AND THE INCARNATION

A few moments ago, in discussing Christ's universal final causality, we saw that the Incarnation was willed as the proximate end of the entire universe. From this it seems to follow that it was not willed solely, or even primarily, as a remedy for sin. On the contrary, it appears that the very permission for sin was, like everything else, given by God on account of the Incarnate Word; in the words of Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., "propter ipsum Christum permissum est peccatum originale." [31]

Thus the view of many theologians that the Incarnation is primarily a remedy for sin seems incompatible with the principle of finality, which tells us that the *means* God uses cannot be nobler than the *end* He intends to accomplish. It also seems difficult to justify this view (that the Incarnation was decreed primarily for the sake of men) in the light of St. Paul's express

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[21] Cornelius a Lapide, *loc. cit.*, note 4, above.

[22] See, e.g., Rom. 9:21; 1 Cor. 14:22; 2 Cor. 4:11; Phil. 4:16; etc.

[23] Knabenbauer, *op. cit.* (note 20, above), vol. 4, p. 298.

[24] *Ibid.*, and cf. note 4, above.

[25] "Causa finalis quodammodo omnium praecipua dici potest" —I. Iturrioz, S.J., "Metphysica generalis," *Summa philosophiae-scholasticae* (2nd ed., Madrid: B.A.C., 1957), vol. 1, p. 828.

[26] "Semper enim imperfectum est propter perfectius"—St. Thomas, *S.T.*, I, 105, 5 (*ed. cit.*, note 11, above), vol. 1, p. 631a.

[27] See Duns Scotus, *Rep. Par.*, III, 7, 4 (ed. C. Bailió, O.F.M., *J. D. Scoti Doctoris Mariani theologiae marianae elementa [Bibliotheca Mariana Medii Aevi, fasc.* 2; Kacic, 1933], pp. 14-15).

[28] For representative examples of the traditional understanding of the God-Man's universal finality, see St. Maximus Conf., *Quaest. LX ad Thalass.* (*P.G.* 90, 622) and St. Jerome, *In Ep. ad Eph., c.* 5 (*P.L.* 26, 454).

[29] "Pars ignobilior est propter nobiliorem"—St. Thomas, *S.T.*, I, 65, 3, *c.* (*ed. cit.*, note 11, above), vol. 1, p. 2787a; cf. note 26, above.

[30] H. Denziger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum* (23rd ed., rev. J. B. Umberg; Friburg-im-B.: Herder, 1937) n. 799, p. 287 (citing *Conc. Trid. Sess.* VI, *de just., c.* 7: "Huius iustificationis causae sunt: finalis quidem gloria Dei et Christi").

[31] R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., "Motivum Incarnationis fuit motivum misericordiae," *Angelicum* 7 (1930), 289-302; p. 299. In fairness to Garrigou-Lagrange, though, we should note that his *explanation* of the position with which we agree is different from our own. He seems to mean that unless God permitted sin, He could not have become incarnate. Therefore, since He wanted to become Incarnate ("propter Christum") He permitted sin. In our position, though, God wills the Incarnation absolutely and permits sin because sin will somehow redound to the happiness and glory of Christ. Elsewhere, Garrigou-Lagrange cites in favor of his position such illustrious Thomists as Cajetan, Godoy, the Salmanticenses, Gonet, Billot, and Hugon; see "De motivo Incarnationis," *Acta P. Acad. Rom.*, 10 (1945), p. 14.

teaching that everything (*tà pánta*) was willed for the sake of Christ (Col. 1:16).

Scripture and the Creed do, in fact, tell us that our Lord "came to save sinners," that He "descended from heaven on account of us men," etc.; but these statements should be understood in their context, which is a "gospel," an announcement of the good tidings of *salvation*. These expressions do not, it seems, tell us that Christ exists only, or even primarily, for the purpose of saving us; rather, they seem to state only the fact that Christ is, among other things, our Savior.[32]

A. Would the Word Have Become Incarnate, If Adam Had Not Sinned?

But why have some theologians understood these scriptural texts in an exclusive sense? We believe the reason for this opinion lies in the rather unfortunate way in which this whole subject came to be treated by the early Scholastics. Instead of asking whether the Incarnation was *end* or *means*, the early Schoolmen set up a hypothesis. "Suppose," they said, "that Adam had never sinned at all. Would there still have been an Incarnation?"

Now, on the surface this question seems legitimate enough, but if we examine it more closely, we see that it conceals an insuperable dilemma; i.e., either answer we attempt to give it will prove to be unacceptable. If we say that there would not have been an Incarnation, we presume that the sole motivating cause of the Incarnation was the Redemption (for only thus can we logically maintain that there would have been no Incarnation in a sinless universe). In the third section of this article, however, we saw that the Redemption cannot be the sole motivating cause of the Incarnation, for Christ, being nobler than other men, cannot exist only or even primarily to be their Redeemer. Hence the negative answer, which is based on a false presumption, is erroneous. If, on the other hand, we answer that Christ "would have come in any event," we presume to know what God would have done under any circumstances whatever. We say, equivalently, that no matter what kind of universe God wanted to create, He would have to become incarnate in it. This conclusion, however, is incompatible with the Catholic teaching that the Incarnation was freely willed by God and might not have been willed at all.

It is not difficult to see, then, why a true understanding of this question has been so long delaved. Just as it was impossible to settle the question of the Immaculate Conception until theologians stopped asking "in what moment *after* conception Mary was 'sanctified,' " so it was impossible to determine whether the Incarnation was end or means until theologians stopped asking "*whether* Christ would have come *if* Adam had not sinned."

Avoiding hypotheses like this one, we find that we live in a universe in which both sin and the Incarnation exist. Then, rather than assume that sin was the primary season for the Incarnation and ask what would have happened in a sinless universe, we ask instead what kind of order God has established in the actual universe in which we live. Approaching the problem in this way, we find that God has placed an order among all the beings of the universe such that the less noble are ordered toward the more noble: the mineral toward the plant, the plant toward the animal, the animal toward man, man toward Christ, and Christ toward God (cf. 1 Cor. 3:22-23).

In this framework, which is called for both by Col. 1:16 and by the basic principles of natural reason, we shall seek to view sin and the suffering it entails not as the cause of the Incarnation, but rather as permitted for the sake of Christ.

B. Why Would God Have Permitted Sin for the Sake of Christ?

This, then, is the true question. Why would God permit sin in a universe centered about Christ? In other words, how could sin possibly redound to Christ's glory? [33] That it must do so seems to us to be beyond question, as we have said, but how it does so is a very difficult question, which involves one of the most profound mysteries of our Faith. Nevertheless, with due reverence for the inscrutable designs of divine Providence, we should like to submit the following idea for the reader's consideration. This seems to be an original solution worked out by John F. Bonnefoy, O.F.M., and is centered about two basic premises: (1) God would want Christ, His Masterpiece, to know the most perfect joy possible; and (2) according to our Lord's own words (Acts 20:35), the joy of giving is more perfect than that of receiving.

Now, how can the Incarnate Word, the unique Mediator and Head of all creation, best know this most perfect joy of giving? He can be the Mediator in this sense, first of all, that God would allow Him to distribute all the natural and supernatural benefits He wishes to bestow upon the universe. Or, on the other hand, He might be enabled in some way to *earn* or *merit* the gifts He is to distribute to the world. Indeed, if Christ is to know the joy of giving to the greatest possible degree, it seems as though God would almost have to choose this second course of action.

For if we analyze the notion of "gift," we see that

[32] St. Thomas distinguishes clearly between a "useful" end (which we should call, in this case, the salvation of mankind) and a final cause properly so-called (in this case, Christ's own glory); see *II Sent.*, XV, 1, 1, *ad* 6 (ed. Parma, 1856), vol. 6, p. 513.

[33] This is not at all the same question, of course, as the one which asks *how* God implemented such a permission. This latter question involves grace and free will, evil and the divine premotion. A good theory of how sin is possible may be found in Maritain's *Existence and the Existent* (Garden City: Image, 1956), pp. 92-128; see J. H. Nicolas' discussion of Maritain's position in the *Revue Thomiste* 60 (1960), 5-37, 185-206, 509-46.

it is best realized when (1) the donor exercises true ownership over what he gives, and (2) the recipient has absolutely no right to what he receives. An almoner does not "give," for instance, when he merely distributes alms for his employer; nor does a factory worker receive a "gift" when he is paid for his week's work.

Applying these conclusions to Christ, we find that His suffering and death *earned* the graces and benefits He gave to men and thus enabled Him to *give* more perfectly. Likewise, we find that by their sins men not only did not deserve the benefits in question, but actually deserved punishment from Christ. From this standpoint too, then, the "gift" of Christ is enhanced.

To give Christ the more blessed joy (Acts 20:35) of giving to the utmost, therefore, God allowed men to sin. Christ is thus enabled to give perfect expression to His love by "laying down his life" not only for His friends (Jn. 15:13), but even for those who had made themselves His enemies—and thereby communicating to them supernatural life and beatitude (Rom. 5:15-19).[34]

No doubt a fuller treatment of this important mystery—the mystery of sin and evil—would have been most desirable and enlightening, but the limitations of this article clearly rule out any further discussion. Besides, as we have said, we are face to face with one of the deepest mysteries of our Faith, one which can never be satisfactorily "explained." It seems very important to us, on the other hand, to stress the point that no matter what explanation is given of sin—even if no explanation at all can be given—the existence of sin and suffering in the world should nevertheless not be cited as an argument against Christ's universal final causality. For even if we were to assume that the Incarnation had for its final motive the redemption of mankind, we still have not explained sin, evil, or suffering.

No, regardless of what explanation we give for sin, there seems to be little doubt in the mind of St. Paul that "all things were made through and for" Christ. The glory of Christ Himself, rather than the redemption of mankind, certainly seems to be the secondary end of the Incarnation. And needless to say, the glory of God Himself is the primary end, not only of the Incarnation, but of all God's works *ad extra*.

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[34] Bonnefoy, *op. cit.* (note 8, above), pp. 380-417. M. J. Scheeben has a somewhat similar explanation, based more on Christ's power than His mercy and love. "If the race had originally, prior to its sin, received its supernatural goods from the God-Man, then the truth would not have been so manifest that He, and He alone, is and can be the source of these goods. . . . And if the God-man had had no evil to combat . . . His divine, all-conquering might, operating only in the silent distribution of graces, would have lacked a theater ample enough for the full range of its activity"—*The Mysteries of Christianity* (tr. C. Vollert, S.J.; St. Louis: Herder, 1946), pp. 399-400.

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THE REFORM MOVEMENT OF CARDINAL FRANCISCO XIMENEZ DE CISNEROS

by KEVIN E. FITZGERALD, O.F.M.

If the 20th Century could be called the most progressive of centuries, the 16th century could be designated the most revolutionary, characterized as it was by religious, social, economic, political, and cultural upheaval. It witnessed the Protestant Revolt, the Catholic Reformation, the Council of Trent, and the rise of national governments. The seeds for this revolutionary age were sown in the previous century when the world saw the rise of the humanistic Renaissance, the growth of pietism, and the development of colonialism and commercialism, all marking the birth of the Modern Age.

We might consider the years 1492-1517 as the transition period for this Age of Revolution. In this quarter of a century, Spain emerged as a world power under Ferdinand and Isabella, America was discovered by Columbus, and one of the greatest spiritual and intellectual reform movements of all times was accomplished by Spain's greatest statesman and ecclesiastic, Cardinal Francisco Ximénez de Cisneros (1436-1517). The object of this article is to treat of Cisneros' work of reform, which was truly "the greatest achievement of his life." [1] It is unfortunate that so little has been written about Cardinal Cisneros [2] in English, but this deficiency has been more than balanced by the large amount of Cisnerian writings in other languages.[3]

The reform movement of Cardinal Cisneros may be considered from a twofold aspect: one negative (the reform of the religious orders and the diocesan clergy), the other positive (the foundation of the University of Alcalá, the publication of the polyglot Bible, and the diffusion of religious literature).[4] The schematic arrangement of this twofold aspect will be used as the outline for our treatment of the Cisnerian reform.

EARLY LIFE (1436-1492)

The life of Francisco Ximénez de Cisneros may be divided into two stages: the first (1436-1492) represents his relative historical obscurity; the second (1492-1517) represents his historical prominence. It seems best to report in some detail the early life of Cisneros insofar as it will help to explain his later role as a reformer and founder of the theological Renaissance in Spain.

The facts about the Cardinal's early life are neither too clear nor too certain. He was born in a small town, Torrelaguna, situated near Madrid in the diocese of Toledo in 1436. His father, Alfonso, held a minor government position as collector of taxes. The ancestral birthplace of the family was Cisneros, a town in the Kingdom of Leon. It seems that Gonzales (his baptismal name) was destined early to the ecclesiastical state, and for this reason was sent at the age of ten to Alcalá for elementary studies.[5] Four years later, he began the study of civil and canon law at the University of Salamanca, so distinguishing himself in these studies that he was immediately allowed to pursue philosophical and theological subjects.

Arriving in Rome in 1459, the twenty-three year old Cisneros undertook the practice of law in the consistorial courts. From one of his early biographers, Fray Pedro Quintanilla, we learn that the young lawyer soon gained a reputation both for learning and for the alacrity with which he dispatched his cases—no mean thing, this, in law courts! He was ordained in the Eternal City and, when forced to return to Spain in 1465 to aid his widowed mother and two younger brothers, he received for his outstanding services at Rome a *letra expectiva* which entitled him to the next vacant benefice in Spain. Unfortunately, his biographers have recorded nothing of his activities for the next eight years. The next incident we know of, is in 1473, when Cisneros, in virtue of his *letra expectiva,* claimed the benefice of archpriest of Uzeda which was in his home diocese. Don Alfonso de Carillo, the Arch-

[1] "La Reforma es la principal hazaña de su vida." P. Quintanilla, O.F.M., *Archetypo de Virtudes, espexo de Prelados, el venerable Padre y Siervo de Dios, Fray Francisco Ximénez de Cisneros* (Palermo: Bua, 1653), *lib.* 1, p.28. All translations in this article are my own.

[2] We refer to the Cardinal by the name Cisneros for several reasons: first, it is the name of the ancestral birthplace of his family; secondly, to avoid confusing the Cardinal with other historical personages who bear this common Spanish surname of Ximénez (Ximénes, Jiménez, Jiménes); thirdly, historical works written in Spanish prefer Cisneros in designating the Cardinal; and, fourthly, custom seems to warrant using the name of the ancestral birthplace as the surname of famous nobles, cardinals, etc., as is the case with Armand Jean du Plessis, Duc de Richelieu, who is better known as Cardinal Richelieu.

[3] The Count of Cedillo, *El Cardenal Cisneros, gobernador del Reino* (Madrid: Real Academia, 1931), has an excellent bibliography of Cisneriana written from the 16th century to 1930. His own book gives valuable information about the Cardinal's last regency.

[4] "Dans ce domaine, il a inspiré et dirigé une oeuvre immense de restauration disciplinaire, intellectuelle et spirituelle, qui comporte une partie négative et une partie positive. La première était la condition de la seconde, mais il lui fallut les mener de front, car c'étaient des tâches de longue haleine, et il ne pouvait remettre l'une jusqu'à ce que l'autre fût achevée." R. Aubenas and R. Richard, "L'Eglise et la Renaissance (1449-1517)," *Historie de L'Eglise,* (ed. A. Fliche and V. Martin; Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1951), vol. 15, p. 300.

[5] Quintanilla, *op. cit.,* p. 6. The residence of the Archbishops of Toledo and a Franciscan friary were located in Alcalá. Cisneros was later to found the famous university in this town.

bishop of Toledo, refused to recognize Cisneros' title. This ecclesiastic, like the rest of the Spanish clergy, resented Papal privileges like the *letras expectivas* which restricted their own power of patronage and appointment. When Carillo informed Cisneros that he had already promised the next vacant benefice in his diocese to a member of his household, Cisneros still insisted on his right to the benefice, and firmly refused to cede his right even to the Archbishop of Toledo. Fr. Hefele remarks in his biography of the Cardinal that "seldom did any one venture to resist such a prelate; but from that day Ximénez began to exhibit that remarkable feature in his character to which he was indebted afterward as the means of his exaltation—I mean, that unalterable, unshaken firmness which no danger could subdue, when there was any occasion of defending right against might." [6] Don Carillo had Cisneros arrested and imprisoned at Uzeda, ordering his detainment there until he renounced his benefice. Cisneros did not give in, and after a few years was removed to the ecclesiastical prison in the fortress of Santorcaz. After six years of imprisonment, Cisneros was released and given the benefice for which he had so strongly fought. The years of captivity had changed him, however, so that he tactfully exchanged the *arciprestazgo* of Uzeda for the less lucrative benefice of a chaplaincy in the diocese of Sigüenza.

The Bishop of Sigüenza and Chancellor of Spain at the time was Don Pedro Gonzalez de Mendoza. In 1474, this worthy prelate had received the Cardinal's hat, the title of Primate of Spain, and the Archbishopric of Seville from King Enrique IV (it was not unusual in those days for a bishop to have several dioceses as benefices). Cisneros had meanwhile acquired a reputation for holiness and learning which soon recommended him as Mendoza's choice for administrator and vicar-general of Sigüenza. While holding this responsible office, he never slackened in his study of theological matters, especially of Sacred Scripture. In fact, he engaged the services of a Jewish rabbi to teach him Hebrew and Aramaic so he could read the Scriptures in the original languages.[7] This scholarly avocation was to be of immense value in later years when he undertook the publication of the Polyglot Bible. While in Sigüenza, he helped a certain Juan López de Medina, archpriest of Almazán, to found the University of Sigüenza. Another heavy burden Cisneros assumed along with his administration of the diocese was the care of the large estates of Don Juan de Silva, the Count of Cifuentes, who had been taken captive by the Moors in 1482. But restlessness stirred him to follow more the dictates of his temperament which was inclined to a life of solitude, contemplation and study. Thus it was, that in 1484, Cisneros informed Cardinal Mendoza that he was going to enter the Order of Franciscan Observants. Reluctantly, Mendoza released him and Cisneros, now almost fifty years old, was received and professed within a year at the Franciscan Monastery of San Juan de los Reyes in Toledo. Gonzales Ximénez de Cisneros now became Frav Francisco.

While at the Monastery of San Juan, many men and women came to him for spiritual direction. But the desire to lead a more eremetical life impelled him to ask permission to retire to the more austere monastery of Our Lady of Castañar (so called because it was set in a grove of chestnut trees). In this retreat Cisneros passed three years of contemplation and penance. "After he was made Archbishop of Toledo, Cardinal of Spain and regent of Castile, he would remember his cell and the quiet of Castañar, sigh for his beloved solitude, and say that if he might he would give up the throne of Toledo and cardinalate for what he had at Castañar, and that he would be the richer in happiness thereby." [8] Again the fame of his holiness drew souls to him for spiritual counsel, and again his superiors transferred him to another convent—that of Salzeda. It was in this monastery that Cisneros was elected Guardian or Superior. His early biographer, Fray Quintanilla, tells us that he was frequently summoned to the Provincial headquarters in Toledo as a consultor on matters pertaining to the Order. Little time elapsed before he was called upon to assume greater burdens. His virtues and talents would soon rise to cast their splendid rays upon the Church and Spain.

Cardinal Mendoza had more than once expressed his regret at being deprived of the talented Cisneros, and he was accustomed to speak of him in words that proved to be prophetic: "This man was not meant to be hidden. It will be necessary to take him from his monastery and give him a great mission from which the world will profit." [9] In the year that Columbus discovered America and the Jews were expelled from Spain, Cisneros was summoned to the royal court to receive his appointment as confessor to the great Queen Isabella. Her previous confessor, Fernando de Talavera, a gentle, tactful Jeronymite monk of Jewish ancestry, had been appointed Archbishop of the new See of Granada, and Isabella had turned to the great Mendoza to recommend another confessor. The Archbishop of Toledo (he had received this appointment in 1482 after Carillo's death) lost no time in recommending his former vicar-general, Cisneros. The latter refused to accept this responsible office, realizing that it involved giving counsel not only in spiritual, but in temporal matters as well. His refusal only strengthened Isabella's determination to have him as her confessor. Cisneros finally accepted, on the condition that he be allowed to remain in his monastery and appear at court only when summoned. However, as Hefele remarks, "the more Ximénez endeavoured to abstain from all interference in political matters, so much more frequently did Isabella seek his advice, until at last she resolved to execute nothing of importance without having beforehand heard his opinion." [10]

REFORM OF THE RELIGIOUS ORDERS

The general laxity which pervaded the Church found no exception in the religious orders. Several cogent reasons have been offered to explain this departure of

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[6] A. von Hefele, *The Life of Cardinal Ximénez* (trans., Canon Dalton; Baltimore, J. Murphy, 1860), pp. 8-9. The best work in English on the life of Cisneros. We have used this extensively in the writing of this article.

[7] Quintanilla, *op. cit.*, p. 10. Chaldaic is used improperly by this author to mean Biblical Aramaic. We have corrected this in our text.

[8] R. Merton, *Cardinal Ximenes and the Making of Spain*, (London: Kagan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1934), pp. 8-9.

[9] *"Cét homme n'est pas fait pour estre caché. Il faudra le tirer de son Couvent, pour luy donner quelque grande Charge, & le Public en profitera."* E. Flechier, *Histoire du Cardinal Ximenes*, (Paris: Anisson, 1693), p. 13.

[10] Hefele, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

the orders from their original spirit. The Black Plague (1348) had so depopulated the religious houses that some were forced to accept unsuitable candidates who, at times, lacked even the fundamental prerequisites for the religious life.[11] Too, the Western Schism (1378-1417) had thrown the entire Christian world into turmoil, so that even saints were divided in their allegiance to Papal claimants. It is not surprising, then, that this dissension affected the monasteries. The third and more immediate reason for the general laxity of the orders was the facility with which the latter obtained privileges and dispensations from their respective Rules and Constitutions.[12]

Cisneros was elected Provincial Superior of Castile in 1494.[13] At the time of his election, he was absent from the Pentecost Chapter of his Order which was held at the Observant Convent of San Esteban de Los Olmos on the outskirts of Burgos. The reason for his absence from the Chapter was that Queen Isabella had obtained from Pope Alexander VI a brief empowering her to appoint someone to investigate all religious houses throughout her kingdoms (Castile and Aragon).[14] Cisneros was her logical choice.

The restoration of regular discipline was something close to the heart of Isabella as well as Cisneros. The pious Queen realized the need for fervent and devout religious orders to act as a leaven injecting spiritual strength into the people of Spain. Naturally, the zealous Cisneros desired all religious orders, especially his own, to return to the spirit of their founders. However, as one author correctly asserts, Cisneros was not the first to initiate reform among the Franciscans:

> Indeed, the reform of the regulars had already been under way for a long time in several regions of Spain when Cisneros became Archbishop of Toledo. . . . Among the Friars of Castile, to whom Cisneros himself belonged, and of whom he was Provincial, the *reformati* or Observants, with the great names of Pedro Regalado (d. 1456), Pedro de Villacreces, Pedro de Santoyo, Antonio de Aguilera, Lope de Salinas, and Diego de Alcalá who inspired the Italian reforms, did not cease to gain ground at the expense of the Conventuals or non-reformed *claustrales*.[15]

Cisneros undertook the visitation of all the convents of his Province in company with a certain Francisco Ruiz whose intelligence and affability soon won for him the lifelong friendship of the great reformer. Later, as Archbishop of Toledo, Cisneros was to recommend Ruiz for the bishopric of Avila. The results of his visitations made Cisneros only more determined to conduct a total reform of the religious orders, and especially his own.

> For besides the license which generally prevailed in the regular communities, he found that the majority of the religious of St. Francis had overthrown the form of life of their institute. They had rejected that poverty which had been so recommended to them. They possessed houses in town and in country which enjoyed large revenues. Such as those who were called Conventuals had rich and magnificent convents throughout Spain. Those on the other hand who observed the Rule in its rigor and were called for this reason Fathers of the Observance, had only a few convents and these were very small.[16]

Having completed his arduous visitation of the large Franciscan Province of Castile, Cisneros reported his findings to the Queen. Isabella, now more than ever, resolved to have all the religious orders follow their respective observant branches. Thus, on February 13, 1495, by virtue of a Bull issued by Alexander VI, *los reyes catolicos* notably amplified Cisneros' faculties, conferring on him the official title of Apostolic Reformer of all the religious orders in the kingdoms.

Hefele summarizes the *modus agendi* of the Cisnerian reform of the orders in these words:

> Supported by the royal authority, Ximénez especially endeavoured to transform the Conventuals into "Observantines," so called because they adhered to the primitive rule. He then took away from the monasteries all the possessions which they were not allowed to retain: he expelled the unworthy members, and endeavoured to induce the better disposed to embrace the reform. To many he offered pensions, if they should wish to leave the order, and make room for others who would be willing to lead an austere life.[17]

This offer was accepted by the Franciscans of Toledo, who, as if in mockery of Cisneros, left their convent in procession carrying a cross before them and singing the 113th Psalm: "In exitu Israel de Aegypto . . ." [18]

It was not long before his adversaries had recourse to Rome to check this unrelenting reformer. The General of the Order, who was a Conventual, Francisco Nanni (Samson) was entirely opposed to the radical reform conducted by Cisneros. At first, he tried to alienate Cisneros from the favor of the Queen; failing in this, he returned to Rome and gave an unfavorable report on the reform to the Pope.[19] This report, along with the disparaging testimony of one Cardinal Ascanio Sforza, who was favorable to the Conventuals and to influential Spanish nobles (grandees),[20] influenced Alexander VI to send Conventual representatives to assist in the reform and moderate what were thought to be the excessive measures of Cisneros. These soon returned to Rome and complained that Cisneros

[11] Quintanilla, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

[12] Classic examples of these *Bulla privilegiata* are those of Sixtus IV: *Mare Magnum* (1474) and *Bulla Aurea* (1479). The extraordinary privileges granted by these Bulls evoked comment (not without merit) that the privileges of the *Mare Magnum* were as extensive as the *Mare Nostrum* (the Mediterranean Sea). For more information concerning these Bulls, cf. R. Huber, O.F.M. Conv., *A Documented History of the Franciscan Order* (1182-1517) (Milwaukee: Nowing, 1944), pp. 421-422.

[13] This is the most likely date. Some have offered 1493 and 1495 as additional possibilities. Cf. P. Ignacio Omaechevarría, O.F.M., "Un plantel de seráfica santidad en las afueras de Burgos. San Esteban de los Olmos (1453-1836)," *Archivo-Ibero Americano* 10 (1950), p. 221.

[14] Quintanilla, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

[15] Aubenas-Ricard, *op. cit.*, p. 300.

[16] Flechier, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.

[17] Hefele, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

[18] *Ibid.*, citing Robles, *Compendio de la Vida y Hazañas del Cardenal Don Fray Francisco Ximenez de Cisneros* (Toledo: 1604), p. 68.

[19] Flechier, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-58.

[20] The Conventuals found numerous supporters among the nobility. "Many of the best families had tombs and mortuary chapels in the churches of the Conventuals. But as the Observantines, who were to be introduced in their place, were not allowed to receive remuneration for services performed, nor any revenues for pious foundations; so these noble families began to fear that the masses and prayers for their ancestors would cease altogether, especially as a false report had spread that Ximénez intended to divert the foundations to other purposes." Hefele, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

(this was not surprising) had refused to have anything to do with them. As a result, Alexander sent a brief dated November 9, 1496, to Ferdinand and Isabella, ordering a suspension of the reform.[21] Cisneros was not to be put off so easily from a work he knew was necessary for the good of the Church, the Order, and Spain. With Isabella's mediation, he made persistent requests for a resumption of the reform which Alexander finally granted when Cisneros and two Spanish bishops (of Catanea and Jaen) were made Apostolic Commissaries of the reform.[22] With this decisive and authorized approval of his work, he proceeded to complete what he had begun.

> He commanded a return to the ancient spirit of penance, especially poverty, and succeeded in overcoming by his persistence, the opposition of the Conventuals. The foundations of the latter were distributed to poor churches, their revenues and income were used for the construction of hospices and the upkeep of needy monasteries. The Conventuals themselves had to reform or give over their houses to the Observance. It can be said that by 1508, the Conventuals had lost all influence in Spain.[23]

Whatever criticism might be directed against the manner in which Cisneros conducted the reform, it cannot be denied that many salutary benefits derived from it for the honor of the Church, the Order, and Spain.[24] As regards the reform of the other religious orders in Spain, they conformed with laudable docility.[25] With the reform of the religious orders now completed, Cisneros, already consecrated Archbishop of Toledo, could intensify his efforts in the reform of the diocesan clergy, which he had already initiated.

THE REFORM OF THE DIOCESAN CLERGY

Before his death on January 11, 1495, the Great Cardinal Mendoza recommended Cisneros as his successor in the See of Toledo, the richest and most influential office in Spain after the Crown itself. The wise and faithful Cardinal knew that Cisneros' talents, combined with his common social status, would enable the latter to uphold the dignity and integrity of this responsible office. Queen Isabella herself acted as executrix of Mendoza's will and obtained the Papal decree appointing Francisco Ximénez de Cisneros as Archbishop of Toledo and Chancellor of Castile. When she presented the decree of nomination to Cisneros, he was so shocked on reading the words, "To our beloved son, Francisco, Archbishop of Toledo", that he literally fled from the palace to the Franciscan monastery at Ocaña.[26] After six months of adamant refusal to accept the dignity, he relented to the Queen's command and was consecrated bishop in the presence of the royal couple on October 11, 1495, in the Franciscan monastery at Tarazona.

The diocesan clergy was as badly in need of reform as the regulars. Their decadence could be traced to several of the reasons we have already cited in reference to the regulars, but more specifically we will mention: 1) the possession of large revenues and extensive property by bishops; 2) the idleness consequent upon too many ecclesiastics and too few responsibilities; 3) the abundance of richly endowed benefices which attracted many to the clerical state who lacked the moral and intellectual qualifications; 4) the spread of Judaistic errors among the poorly educated clergy; and 5) the bestowal of ecclesiastical offices, even bishoprics, upon the illegitimate offspring of kings and grandees.[27]

The first opportunity Cisneros had to take possession of his diocese was in the middle of 1497. Before this time, however, he had informed the canons of his Cathedral Chapter in Toledo that he wanted them to observe more closely the common life they were obligated to by their office, and that he would take further measures to insure this would be done by having a residence built for them near the cathedral. Shaken from their lethargy, the canons conspired to have one of their number, Alfonso Albernoz by name, sent to Rome to obtain papal confirmation of the Chapter in its present state and protection from the reform about to be introduced by their Archbishop. When Cisneros heard of their plan, he sent by royal authority, a police officer to the nearest port to prevent Albornoz from embarking. He had already set sail—but Cisneros had prepared for this contingency. He commissioned a fast-sailing galley to overtake the other vessel and, at the same time, wrote to the Spanish Ambassador in Rome, Garcilasso de la Vega, to arrest the canon and send him back to Spain. Everything happened according to plan and the unhappy Albornoz was imprisoned for several months. Needless to say, the canons offered no further opposition to their iron-willed Archbishop.

His address to the Chapter of Toledo is indeed a model of pastoral zeal which merits at least partial reference. Counseling them to respond to the responsibilities of their high calling, the Archbishop left no doubt in their minds that he intended to carry through his program of reform:

> As for myself, I will act candidly with you, by assuring you that whomsoever I shall see walking through this life piously, and ascending step by step towards the heavenly Jerusalem, those I shall not only encourage in their efforts, but will watch over their interests, and honour them with my confidence and esteem. But if any amongst you should err from the paths of justice (which God forbid), and walk in the ways of this world, and fall into the abyss of vice, I shall follow in their regard the example of the good Samaritan in the gospel, and pour out on them oil and wine in such proportions that they will feel more the sweetness and refreshment of the oil than taste of the sourness of the wine; unless, however, some deep corruption should require the knife or the fire; then, in spite of my repugnance, I should be obliged to have recourse to these extreme measures, whenever my conscience before God and your good should demand this duty of me. But I am confident that better fruit will come from so venerable and prudent a chapter.[28]

Cisneros was not one to preach what he did not practice. The penitential life he led as a religious was

[21] L. Palomes, O.F.M. Conv., *Dei Frati Minori,* (Palmero: Palomes, 1897), pp. 317-318, citing A. Gomez, *De Rebus Gestis a Fr. Ximenio Cisnerio, Hispaniae Illustratae seu Rerum Urbiumque Hispaniae Scriptores varii opera et studio Doctorum hominum, lib.* 1, *fol.* 942 (Frankfort: 1603).

[23] L. Wadding, O.F.M., *Annales Minorum,* 3rd ed. (Quaracchi: 1933) vol. 15, p. 147. Cf. also Hefele, *op .cit.,* p. 216.

[23] Aubenas-Ricard, *op. cit.,* p. 301.

[24] For the position of the Conventual historians, cf. L. Palomes, O.F.M.Conv., *op. cit.,* pp. 309-333, and R. Huber, O.F.M.Conv., *op. cit.,* pp. 446-453.

[25] Cf Quintanilla, *op. cit.,* pp. 24-33 for general information on the Cisnerian reform of the Military as well as the Religious Orders other than the Franciscan Order. Unfortunately, little information is at all available in regard to the reform of these other Orders—cf. Aubenas-Ricard, *op. cit.,* p. 300.

[26] A full account of this almost humorous episode is in Hefele, *op. cit.,* pp. 36-38.

[27] *Ibid.,* pp. 197-201.

[28] *Ibid.,* pp. 205-207 give the complete text of the address.

not abandoned or even mitigated when he became Archbishop of Toledo. The palace at Alcalá was converted into a veritable monastery with ten Franciscan friars constituting the staff of one who was both primate and chancellor. No silver adorned his table; no ornamentation bedecked his apartments. His meals were as plain as those served in any poor monastery, and his garment was the rough Franciscan habit which he himself mended. Being a Franciscan, heart and soul, Cisneros wished to realize in his own person that apostolic poverty which had been so highly recommended to all the followers of Poverello of Assisi. However, even those who were well disposed to the Archbishop were not averse to criticizing his apparent neglect in maintaining his episcopal dignity. The result of this criticism was that Cisneros received a Papal brief dated December15, 1495 which commanded him to conform externally to the dignity of his state, while at the same time it expressed Alexander's admiration of the Archbishop for leading a life "according to God and your conscience".[29] Cisneros obeyed the Pope and conformed outwardly to the grandeur of his office, although he still wore his Franciscan habit under his episcopal robes.

Archbishop Cisneros held his first synod at Alcalá in 1497 and another at Talavera in 1498. Though the *acta* of these have not come down to us, two early biographers have listed the more significant decrees.[30] 1° Confessors were given the right to absolve one another from all cases reserved to the Ordinary so that none might be prevented from offering Mass; 2° All who had the *cura animarum* were obliged to explain the Gospel on Sundays and holydays of obligation; 3° At the evening *Angelus* bell, all the children of the parish were to assemble for the recitation of the *Salve,* in honor of the Blessed Virgin. Then they were to be taught the Creed, articles of faith, the Commandments and other points of Christian doctrine. Within a few years, Cisneros had a catechism published which served as a model for other manuals of Christian instruction throughout Spain. 4° Registers of births and deaths were to be kept in all churches, and curates were bound to keep records of those who led lukewarm or disorderly lives in the diocese. 5° A diocesan synod was to be held annually for the maintenance of ecclesiastical discipline. These synodal decrees were embodied in the constitutions of several successors to the See of Toledo, and thus many of these regulations were activated long after the death of Cisneros.

Even independently of these synods, the zealous Archbishop enacted many salutary measures on behalf of his diocese. He ordered a list to be made of all the parishes, the revenues they possessed, the state of morals among the parishioners, the incomes of particular families and localities, the abuses which prevailed in the parish, etc. He also assigned worthy priests as visitors to introduce reform among the clergy and laity. The appointment of persons to ecclesiastical dignities was an object of his particuar care and attention. He selected for responsible and exalted positions only those who were truly worthy, without regard to rank, birth or previous condition. He made it a point to absolutely reject anyone who sought benefices, so that the intrigue and patronage responsible in part for clerical decadence could be eliminated. Finally, to overcome the opposition of those who claimed exemption from episcopal jurisdiction, Cisneros obtained from Alexander VI, a brief, dated June 23, 1497, which invested him with full and unlimited power over all ecclesiastics in his diocese, whatever might be their privileges or dignities. Thus, we can perceive in all these measures taken by the Archbishop to promote the welfare of his diocese, a knowledge born of experience, namely, that which he acquired as a diocesan priest and as vicar-general. It is this experience which enabled him to treat successfully the problems which faced the Church of Spain.[31]

As we mentioned in the preface of this article, the reform undertaken by Cisneros has a twofold aspect: the negative aspect, namely, the reform of the religious orders and the diocesan clergy, and the positive aspect which comprises the foundation of the University of Alcalá, the publication of the Polyglot Bible, and the diffusion of religious literature. We will now treat these latter three great contributions separately.

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALCALA

In their excellent résumé of the role played by the great Cisneros in the religious restoration of Spain, Aubenas-Ricard assert:

> The positive aspect of the Cisnerian work is seen essentially in the establishment of the University of Alcalá. Here again, it was a matter primarily of religious restoration; the purpose of the new foundation was to elevate the secular and regular clergy to a standard of excellence. The University of Alcalá would be, as has been said, 'a complete organism of ecclesiastical education—on a primary, secondary, and graduate level.' In this frame of reference, it is distinguished from a center of profane humanism like the *College de France*. Although Alcalá dominated the university foundations of that period, it was not isolated. It was part of a movement conspicuous for a multitude of foundations, like that of Sigüenza founded by the Archdeacon of Almazán, Juan López de Medina, that of Oñate in the Basque country by the Bishop of Avila, Mercado de Zuazola, that of Osuna by Count Girón of Ureña, that of Toledo by the savant Francisco Alvarez de Toledo, that of Valencia by Cardinal Rodrigo de Borgia, the future Pope Alexander VI.[32] But Alcalá clearly produced much more than did these local or diocesan colleges.[33]

An authority on the history of the Spanish Universities, Vicente de la Fuente, states that when the Uni-

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[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42 give the English text; Wadding, *op. cit.*, vol. 15, p. 130, has the Latin text.

[30] Gomez, *op. cit.*, fol 21, 22; Robles, *op. cit.*, ch. 15 "De dos Synodos que el Cardenal celebró" is valuable for information on the Synods. Cf. also Hefele, *op. cit.*, pp. 209-211.

[31] "Ces traits révélateurs rappellent qu'avant d'embrasser la vie religieuse, Cisneros avait appartenu au clergé séculier et pratiqué le ministère comme archiprêtre et comme vicaire général. L'expérience qu'il avait alors acquise doit être soulignée, car elle explique sans doute la vaste portée de son action réformatrice, qui, avec des succès divers, n'a laissé dans l'ombre aucun des problèmes qui se posaient à l'Eglise d'Espagne." Aubenas-Ricard, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

[32] Hefele mentions two other foundations besides these—those of Seville founded by Roderigo de San Elia and Granada founded by Archbishop Talavera. (*op cit.*, pp. 116-117).

[33] Aubenas-Ricard, *op. cit.*, p. 302. That the theological training in all these colleges was quite mediocre is also borne out by P. Dominique, O.F.M., "Ximénès, Créateur du Mouvement Théologique Espagnol" (*Etudes Franciscaines* 19 [1908] p. 453), ". . . mais toutes ces fondations étaient insuffisantes et la formation intellectuelle des clercs était plutôt médiocre. De fait les ecclésiastiques qui désiraient se perfectionner dans la théologie étaient obligés de séjourner à l'étranger et d'emprunter ailleurs ce qu'ils ne trouvaient pas chez eux."

versity of Salamanca learned of Cisneros' project, it tried to dissuade him from the enterprise, hoping to win for itself the generous benefactions of the Archbishop. The latter replied that Salamanca had indeed taught well civil and canon law, but its theological training did not satisfy him.[34]

The site of the new University was the little town of Alcalá de Henares, the ancient *Complutum,* some thirty kilometers east of Madrid. In the year 1500, the foundation stone of the theological College of San Ildefonso was laid by the Archbishop with great solemnity. Due to several factors—the Archbishop's burdensome duties, poor health, and a Moorish revolt—construction of the edifice was delayed, and it was not ready for residence until ten years later. Formal classes were not initiated until the autumn of 1509. The first constitutions of the University were promulgated on January 22, 1510.

In addition to the College of San Ildefonso, devoted solely to theological studies (the primary course in the curriculum in accord with Cisneros' intention to build a *theological* institution), several other foundations were built during the lifetime of the Cardinal: boarding schools for students in the classics were established in honor of St. Eugene and St. Isidore. So outstanding was the scholarship in these schools that, according to Erasmus, "Alcalá was especially distinguished by its able philologists."[35] Two other colleges, those of St. Balbina and St. Catherine, were intended for students of philosophy. A sixth college, called the "Little School" was founded in honor of the Apostles St. Peter and St. Paul, where twelve Franciscans devoted themselves entirely to scholarly activities. According to the eminent Franciscan historian, Luke Wadding, a large number of generals of different orders, provincials, bishops, and learned men came from this house of learning.[36] The College of the Three Languages (Latin, Greek and Hebrew) dedicated to St. Jerome, was also founded by Cisneros. Robles remarks that "besides these foundations of the Archbishop, many other institutions arose which owed their origin to the renown of the university; for all the monastic orders in Spain, with the exception of the Benedictines and Jeronymites, established houses of their own in Alcalá, in order to give the young religious an opportunity of studying in such an illustrious place."[37]

The dedication of the theological college and the two colleges of grammar to the three great Visigothic Bishops of Spain (Saints Ildephonse, Isidore and Eugene) was not without significance, as Aubenas-Ricard assert:

> The University of Alcalá inspired a return to the Fathers of the Church, the luminaries of the universal Church, and to the glories of the ancient Hispanic Church; Saints Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine, and Gregory were its great masters. But patristic studies involved a deep knowledge of the learned tongues. Scholastic Latin was insufficient. It was necessary to know Greek, the language of Aristotle, the Oriental Fathers and the New Testament. A knowledge of Hebrew, the language of the Old Testament, was also indispensable. And of course, an acquaintance with Arabic and Syriac was also quite advantageous.[38]

Although Alcalá was universally known for its professors and profound humanistic scholarship, it was primarily a *theological* University. The School of Arts existed solely as a "vestibule" to the School of Theology.[39] And a course in theology demanded a study of the scholastic theologians. At the University of Salamanca, conducted by the Dominicans and the Augustinians, Thomism was taught exclusively; to effect a balance and at the same time be faithful to the traditions of his own Order, Cisneros introduced Scotism on the same level as Thomism. Likewise, a third chair was created for Occamism. What Cisneros wanted was a Spanish Theological movement which favored an *integral Scholasticism,* i.e., a movement in which the best contributions of the Scholastics would be synthesized into an organic theology. Consequently, we see the Franciscan theologians of this movement adopting an absolutely eclectic method toward the study of theology.[40] Not only was the study of Schoastic theology greatly encouraged at Alcalá, but new methods of teaching the sacred science also developed during the commencement of the 16th century.

> At the beginning of the 16th century, a veritable transformation was effected in the teaching of Scholasticism. During the preceding three centuries, the Book of Sentences of Peter Lombard served as the text for teachers of theology. But now, instead of explaining the Sentences, the works of St. Thomas, Duns Scotus, and the other princes of Scholasticism were commented upon. It was now the age in which there appeared the commentaries of Cardinal Cajetan on the *Summa Theologica* and the analogous commentaries of Lychetus of Brescia on the *Oxonienses* of Duns Scotus. . . .[41]

It was primarily the Dominicans and Franciscans who were responsible for the new methods and advances inaugurated in this great Theological Renais-

[34] Dominique, *ibid.,* n. 2, citing V. de la Fuente, *Histoire des Universites Espagnoles,* t. II, ch. VIII.

[35] Hefele, *op. cit.,* citing Erasmus (Epist. 755).

[36] ". . . aliud ex uno latere addidit gymnasium sub *Collegii minoris* nuncupatione, et titulo sanctorum Petri et Pauli Apostolorum pro Fratribus sui Instituti. . . .
". . . sed paucae sunt vel nullae in Religione domus, quantumvis amplissimae, ex quibus prodierint plures viri illustres, vel litteris aut dignitate praestantiores. Hic edocti plurimi provinciarum Rectores, et praestantissimi sacrae Theologiae professores. Ab hoc fertilissimo magnorum virorum seminario multae Hispaniarum et Indiarum Ecclesiae Antistites acceperunt." Wadding, *op. cit.,* vol. 15, p. 165.

[37] Hefele, *op. cit.,* p. 123, citing Robles, *op. cit.,* p. 133.

[38] Aubenas-Ricard, *op. cit.,* p. 303.

[39] *Ibid.,* p. 302.

[40] Dominique, *op. cit.,* 20 [1908] p. 44.

[41] *Ibid.,* p. 46.

No *Reading* without *Unction* . . . *No Speculation* without *Devotion* . . . No *Investigation* without *Exultation* . . . No *Industry without Piety* . . . No *Knowledge* without *Love* . . . No *Understanding* without *Humility* . . . No *Study* without *Divine Grace.*—ST. BONAVENTURE.

sance of 16th century Spain. Other religious orders, like the Carmelites and Augustinians, rivaled them in their zeal for the study of the sacred science. And it was not long before the newly founded Company of Jesus, borrowing from these advances, produced theologians of great repute. To appreciate the immense benefits that accrued to the Church from the Spanish Theological Renaissance, one has only to behold the results which issued from the Council of Trent. Indeed, it is at Trent that we witness the glory and zenith of the Spanish Theological Renaissance. This fact has been poignantly expressed by P. Gettino, who, observing the contributions and numbers of Spanish theologians at the Council, remarks: "The Council of Trent, the most important in the Church, was as Spanish as it was ecumenical." [42] And certainly, Cardinal Cisneros deserves particular mention for the role he played in giving the impetus to the Theological Rennaissance in Spain. In fact, it would be no exaggeration to call him the Founder of the Spanish Theological Renaissance.

> The theological collaboration of the Spanish Franciscans in the formulation of the Tridentine profession of Faith . . . was particularly a fruit of the flowering Spanish theology of the 16th century. *It was a Franciscan, Cardinal Ximénez de Cisneros, who had laid the foundation for the revival of the religious and intellectual life in Catholic Spain.* Franciscans taught at the intellectual centers of renewed Catholic Spain in the University of Salamanca and in the University founded by Ximénez at Alcalá, which devoted itself to the study of the Medieval Scholastics and the mystics of the Franciscan School as well as the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas.[43]

THE POLYGLOT BIBLE

We have already seen in the life of Cisneros his deep interest in Scriptural studies, when he acquired a knowledge of Hebrew and Aramaic in order to read the Bible in the original languages. This devotion to the word of God, in addition to the clergy's neglect of the biblical science and their consequent inability to refute Judaistic and heretical distortions of Scripture, inspired him to publish a Bible containing all the original languages. The University of Alcalá was ideally suited for the publication of the first Polyglot Bible, as Aubenas-Ricard affirm:

> All the facts show that the humanism of Alcalá was entirely at the service of the sacred sciences. Cisneros and his co-workers were not just Christians who labored enthusiastically for a revival of ancient literature or humanists who remained faithful to their Christian Faith and the Roman Church. More than that, they wanted their studies to serve this Faith and this Church—they subordinated their humanism to their religion. The principal fruit of their labors was not the editions and commentaries of Plato, Euripides or Virgil, but an edition of the Bible, the famous Polyglot Bible of Alcalá.[44]

The idea of publishing a Bible in the original languages seems to have occurred to the Cardinal around 1510, just before the German printer Arnao Guillen de Brocar, arrived in Alcalá. The scholars who were commissioned to undertake this tremendous project were the famous Antonio de Lebrija, Demetrios Doucas, and Alfonso de Zamora—professors at the University. Others intimately connected with the great work were Pablo Coronel of Segovia, Diego López Zúñiga, well known by his discussions with Erasmus, Hernán Nuñez de Guzman, professor at Alcalá and author of several commentaries on the classics, Juan de Vergara, and Bartolome de Castro. All these learned men worked under the direction of Cisneros, who supplied all their needs and furnished them with every help necessary for the task. Cisneros himself made intensive searches everywhere for manuscripts of the Old and New Testaments, often purchasing them at an enormous expense. Leo X, before he was made Pope, sent the Cardinal many manuscripts from Rome, and Cisneros, showing his appreciation for this generosity, dedicated the work to this Pontiff.

The first volume of the Polyglot Bible (called the *Complutensian* Polyglot after the ancient Roman designation of Alcala) appeared on January 10, 1514, and the complete edition was published on July 10, 1517, a few months before the Cardinal's death. Without entering into detail, we will summarize the contents of this scriptural masterpiece. The whole work numbers six volumes in-folio. The first four volumes contain the Old Testament in Hebrew, Greek, and Latin; the fifth volume contains the New Testament in Greek and Latin with a corresponding critical apparatus; the sixth volume contains the critical apparatus of the Old Testament with a Hebrew dictionary. The chronological order of the volumes did not correspond to their enumeration; the fifth volume was the first off the press in 1514; then came the sixth in 1515, and finally the four volumes of the Old Testament. Although the Cardinal had the joy of assisting at the completion of this great enterprise, he did not have the pleasure of presenting it to the public, since he first wished to have it approved by the Holy See. In this interval, death took him to his reward, and it was only on March 22, 1520, that a *motu proprio* of Leo X authorized the sale of the copies (600) stored at Alcalá. Although modern recensions have rendered obsolete the Complutensian Polyglot as a critical text, the work which Cardinal Cisneros directed and produced at great personal hardship and expense will always have the honorable distinction of having been the *first* of the Polyglot Bibles and the most ancient of the critical editions of the New Testament.[45]

THE DIFFUSION OF RELIGIOUS LITERATURE

In a center of research and scholarship like Alcalá, an efficient printing establishment was an indispensable aid. An astute businessman, García de Rueda, had

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[42] "El Concilio de Trento, el más importante de la Iglesia, fué tan español como ecuménico." L. Spaetling, O.F.M., "Der Anteil der Franziskaner am Konzil von Trient," *Das Weltkonzil von Trient* (ed. G. Schreiber; Freiburg: Herder, 1951), vol. 2, p. 514, citing P. Gettino in M. Oltra Hernández, *Die Gewiszheit des Gnadenstandes bei Andreas de Vega, O.F.M.* (Duesseldorf: 1941), p. 18.

[43] Spaetling, *ibid.* (emphasis added): "Die theologische Mitarbeit der spanischen Franziskaner an der Formgebung des tridentinischen Glaubens . . . war vornehmlich eine Frucht der blühenden spanischen Theologie des 16. Jahrhunderts. Den Grund zur Neubelebung des religiösen und geistigen Lebens im katholischen Spanien hatte ein Franziskaner, Kardinal Ximenez de Cisneros, gelegt. Franziskaner lehrten an den geistigen Mittelpunkten des katholisch erneuerten Spaniens, an der Universität von Salamanca und an der von Ximenez gegründeten von Alcala, wo sie das Studium der mittelalterlichen Scholastiker und Mystiker aus der Franziskanerschule zusammen dem des hl. Thomas von Aquin pflegten."

[44] Aubenas-Ricard, *op. cit.*, pp. 303-304. For the account of the Polyglot Bible, we use this author's summary *in extenso*.

[45] Hefele, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-140.

founded a printery in the shadow of the new University in 1502. But for the publication of the Polyglot Bible, Cisneros wanted a printing specialist who would be entirely at his service. Thus, he had the German master-printer, Arnao Guillen de Brocar come from Lograño about 1510 to make the necessary Greek and Hebrew types for the Polyglot Bible. It was by means of these two printing establishments that Alcalá became an active center for the publication and diffusion of religious literature during the first quarter of the 16th century. Just as Cisneros had intended to publish the Polyglot as an aid to theological studies, so too he planned to produce a similar monumental work for the study of philosophy, namely, a complete edition of the works of Aristotle.[46] For this purpose he commissioned Juan Vergara and some other scholars versed in Greek and Latin to begin the work. Unfortunately, Cisneros died before this noble enterprise was completed, and the works of Aristotle, which Vergara had already translated, were deposited in the library belonging to the Cathedral of Toledo. But, as Hefele points out, there appeared no second Ximénez to complete the work. The only other strictly scholarly works that were printed at his injunction (besides the Polyglot Bible) were those of the famous Spanish scriptural scholar, Alfonso Tostatus, Bishop of Avila.

However, worthy of mention are the works the Cardinal ordered to be published for the instruction of the people. Among these were the Letters of St. Catherine of Siena, the writings of St. Angela of Foligno, the *Spiritual Ladder* of St. John Climacus, the *Treatise on the Spiritual Life* by St. Vincent Ferrer, the *Book of Spiritual Grace* by St. Mechtilde, *Meditations on the Life of Christ* by the Carthusian, Ludolph of Saxony, the *Rule* of St. Clare, a commentary on the *Miserere* by Savonarola, and a biography of St. Thomas à Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury.[47] Cisneros' reason for printing this "popular" spiritual literature is given by Hefele:

> The intention of Ximénez, in publishing these works, was that they might find their way into domestic circles, and thereby displace all immoral writings thus, by multiplying at his own expense these good books, he hoped also to increase and extend piety and devotion in every direction; for this object he gave away an immense number of copies of the works referred to above.[48]

Before we conclude this section on the diffusion of religious literature it might be well to mention another work which afforded spiritual reading for both clergy and laity. This was the Castilian translation of the *Epistles and Gospels* first compiled by the French Dominican William of Paris in 1437. The Franciscan Ambrosio Montesino (who had translated the work of Ludolph the Carthusian) retranslated the *Epistles and Gospels* which proved to be extremely popular from the time of its publication in 1512 until 1569 when all Scriptural translations, even partial ones, were prohibited. The book was widely propagated and may be regarded as the popular counterpart of the Polyglot Bible which was accessible to scholars only. It provided spiritual reading for the clergy and gave the laity a means of meditating on the Epistles and Gospels of the Mass. Such literature as that diffused by the Cardinal helped to prepare the way for the mystical movement of Spain's Golden Age—the famous *Siglo del Oro*.[49]

OTHER ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF CISNEROS

Although the reform movement initiated and successfully accomplished by the zealous Cardinal represents his greatest work, we cannot pass over without brief mention several other contributions he made for the welfare of the Church and Spain. On May 17, 1507, Pope Julius II bestowed the dignity of Cardinal upon Cisneros. In a letter dated on the following day, Ferdinand wrote from Naples appointing Cisneros General Inquisitor of Castile and Leon to replace the incompetent Diego Deza, the Archbishop of Seville. Cisneros exercised this office with his customary efficiency.

> Scarcely had Ximénes assumed this office than life, stability, and security returned once more to the office of the Inquisition; for in the years 1498-1507, the "Holy Office" had practically gone out of hand. There seems to be no evidence that executions took place in the decade 1507-1517. The first stage of terror was past. *Llorente* reports that no executions took place during Ximénes' time . . Ximénes brought peace and leniency back into the Office of the Inquisition.[50]

Cisneros is rightly esteemed as one of the greatest statesmen Spain has ever possessed. Some historians, however, have censured his ultimatum to the Moors that they be either converted or exiled. In 1499, when he aided the mild Talavera in the work of converting the infidels, he was reproved for his excessive zeal by those who were otherwise favorable to him, as well as by those hostile to him. Cisneros' answer to their objections was that of a man who rejected any compromise when the spread of God's Kingdom was at stake.

> If the Moors can not be led gently in the way of salvation, it is necessary to push them into it. . . . In temporal matters, compromises are sometimes good; in matters where God is concerned, such compromises are always evil. Besides, it is not when Mohammedanism is falling into perdition that we should take action; we must act today.[51]

On two occasions Cisneros acted as Grand Regent of Spain: the first regency occurred after the death of Isabella in 1504; the second after Ferdinand's death in 1516, when he ruled Spain for almost two years until the arrival of young Charles V from Flanders. In both instances he was instrumental in preserving Spain from the avaricious designs of the Spanish grandees. Not without merit, then, has R. Trevor Davies paid homage to the statesmanship of this great man of Spain: "Jimenes, though over eighty years of age, proved himself, now as always in his long life, one of the greatest statesmen Spain has ever possessed."[52]

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[46] "At this period, the Peripatetic philosophy was held in high repute, especially in Spain—an inheritance which had come down to the Christians from the time of the Moors." Hefele, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

[47] This listing represents the combination of those given by Aubenas-Ricard, *op. cit.*, p. 305, and Hefele, *op. cit.*, p. 177. For additional works, cf. P. Pourrat, *Christian Spirituality* (trans., W. H. Mitchell; New York, P. J. Kenedy and Sons, 1927), vol. 3, p. 84, n. 4.

[48] Hefele, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-178.

[49] Cf. Pourrat, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-88.

[50] P. Bonifacius Gams, O.S.B., *Die Kirchengeschichte von Spanien* (Regensburg: G. Manz, 1879), vol. 3, p. 127.

[51] Jean Guiraud, "Saint-Office," *Dictionnaire Apologétique de la Foi Catholique*, (ed. A. D'Alès; Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1928), 4, 1101-1102.

[52] R. Trevor Davies, *The Golden Century of Spain*, (London: Macmillan and Co., 1937), p. 35.

Cisneros' military acumen is evidenced in Spain's conquest of Oran, the Mohammedan kingdom in North Africa. In 1509, when he was seventy-three years old, he organized a crusading army and fleet to overthrow this thriving center of trade with the Levant, which was also a pirate's nest whence the Moslem fleet preyed on Christian shipping and marauded the coasts of Spain. By means of this victory over the Moslem kingdom of Oran, Cisneros "laid the foundations of Spain's African Empire."[53]

The Cardinal's missionary zeal extended to the newly discovered continent of America (which the Spanish called *Hispaniola*). As Wadding reports, ten Franciscan Friars headed by the Prefect Apostolic Alonso del Espinar were sent to the New World in 1502, "to instruct the idolatrous barbarians and administer to Christian souls."[54] Cisneros also appointed the Dominican Bartolomeo Las Casas as protector of the Indians and sent a missionary band of Jeronymite monks to America in 1516 with a list of instructions to be followed by the Spanish colonists in their government of the Indians. These instructions contained most wise and equitable measures which show the Cardinal's paternal solicitude for the welfare of the Indians.

No account of the accomplishments of Cardinal Cisneros would be complete without referring to his zeal for the Liturgy, especially that of the Mozarabic Rite. This ancient Spanish Liturgy had almost fallen into desuetude when the Cardinal restored it to something of its pristine vigor.

> He carefully collected all the best manuscripts of the said Liturgy, and chose Canon Alfonso Ortiz, together with three parish priests attached to the churches of the Mozarabic Rite, to revise the manuscripts; he also changed the ancient Gothic characters (not the language) for the Castilian letters and expended a considerable sum in the printing of a great number of Mozarabic Missals and Breviaries. . . .[55]

He had a beautiful chapel built in his Cathedral at Toledo where a college of thirteen priests with a head chaplain celebrated the Mass and the Divine Office in that Rite. The patronage of the six other parish churches of this Rite was confided to the Chapter of Toledo. Furthermore, this illustrious prelate

> ordered a great number of new works on ecclesiastical music to be published, containing the whole series of church-offices, together with the notes and other musical additions, on parchment. These he distributed to all the churches of his diocese, in order that the Gregorian Chant, which he loved exceedingly, might be everywhere known and understood.[56]

One must stop in amazement at the multiplicity and diversity of the contributions Cisneros made for the welfare of the Church and Spain. It is rare when we can find in one man the qualities of statesman, scholar, patron of learning, reformer and devout religious. Yet Cardinal Cisneros possessed all these qualities in an outstanding degree. Not surprising, then, is the admiration which the famous orator Edmund Burke had for the Cardinal, and which he expressed in these highly laudatory words: "No imagination . . . could have invented a character so extraordinary as that of Cardinal Ximenes; no pen . . . could have described it adequately." [57]

CONCLUSION

The intensive and extensive reform movement realized by Cardinal Cisneros could not but have had powerful repercussions in the Church. The reform which Pope Julius II had been unable to accomplish for the universal Church at the Fifth Lateran Council (1512-1517) was, thanks to Cardinal Cisneros, a *fait accompli* in Spain. And although the dynamic reform which he wrought in Spain could not immediately stop the juggernaut of the Protestant Revolution in other countries of Europe, yet the moment of counterattack was not too distant. The champions of the Counter-Reformation were, for the most part, heirs to that spiritual and intellectual heritage which Cisneros had, by his efforts, imparted to Spain. This is the conclusion of Bihlmeyer-Tuechle, who, in citing the various achievements of the Cisnerian reform, state: "Thus the foundations were laid by which *Spain* would become in a certain sense the *spiritual fatherland* of the *Catholic restoration* and the Counter-Reformation." [58]

When the great Cardinal lay dying in the Franciscan monastery at Roa, on November 8, 1517, he could well say with St. Paul, "I have fought the good fight, I have finished the course, I have kept the faith." [59] The focal point of his thinking and striving was the spread of the Kingdom of God on earth. And it was his Spain, with its great founders and reformers, its zealous missionaries, its inspired spiritual writers, and its ardent mystics, which would champion the cause of Christ and His Church throughout the world. The Divine Master had said: "I have come to cast fire upon the earth, and what will I but that it be kindled?" [60] And it was kindled by Francisco Ximénez de Cisneros.

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[53] W. T. Walsh, "Cardinal Ximenes," *Characters of the Inquisition,* (New York: P. J. Kenedy and Sons, 1940), p. 192.

[54] Wadding, *op. cit.*, vol. 15, p. 285.

[55] Hefele, *op. cit.*, p. 186. The author gives an interesting description of the history and ceremonies of this Rite from pp. 179-194.

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 178.

[57] Merton, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

[58] "So war der Grund dazu gelegt, dasz *Spanien* in gewissem Sinne das *geistige Heimatland* der *Katholischen Restauration* und *Gegenreformation.*" K. Bihlmeyer and H. Tuechle, "Das Mittelalter," *Kirchengeschichte,* 13th ed. (Paderborn: Schoening, 1952) 2, 158. Vol. I of this work, *Church History,* "Christian Antiquity," has been translated by Victor E. Mills, O.F.M. (Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1958); Vols II & III are in process of publication.

[59] 2 Tim., 4:7.

[60] Luke, 12:49.

THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF MARIOLOGY

Stephen C. Doyle, O.F.M.

The year 1854 will not soon be forgotten in the history of dogma. The final repercussions of Pius IX's definition of the Dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin have not been felt, even over one hundred years later. Certainly this definition, by showing the extent of Papal power, had much to do with the definition of infallibility in 1870.[1] From this same time we may trace the growth and emphasis on Marian studies and theory as a whole that has so characterized our own age. The Pope uttered one infallible statement that caused the theologians to take a second look at their science both as to its structure and as to its content. We are fortunate enough to be seeing the fruit of this activity, and are confronted with the same problems for which they are still seeking a solution.

One such is the problem presented by the intense studies of Mariology. There is much to be known and studied about the Mother of God, but is this body of truths to be classified as a science? If so, what is its fundamental principle? The latter question is the one that will be treated of specifically in this study, but it does presuppose some knowledge of the problem of whether Mariology is a science. We could take the position of Fr. Bonnefoy, O.F.M., and that would end the article right here.

> They are quite excited over determining the principles of Mariology, but in vain. It would be as worthwhile to seek the root of a crown of flowers. Mariology is not an autonomous science, but a group of formally revealed truths and conclusions, extracted from theology, a unified and indivisible science. This is our reason for having presented the essentials of a theological synthesis, even though we had in view only to give an *a priori* justification of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception.[2]

This position, though rather isolated and radical among theologians, is not without its obvious merits. Is Ecclesiology a science? or Soteriology? Hardly anyone would think so; yet almost everyone holds Mariology to be a science. And yet, practically speaking, it is most often treated as another tract, and not as a separate study of its own. However, whether it is a science or not, there is still a great deal to the study of Our Lady, and if she can be better understood by treating the study of her as a science, then that is the way to do it. One could not go far wrong if he were to accept the arguments of Fr. Cyril Vollert, S.J., in favor of it as a science.[3]

NATURE OF A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE

If we are to have a science we must have a basis for it, expressed in a fundamental principle. Carol defines that as

> . . . a fundamental truth which furnishes the ultimate reason for the various theses of a given science. In other words it is a basic proposition, accepted by all, which alone gives organic coherence and logical nexus to the whole treatise.[4]

If all that definition were true there would be little dispute today. There is no principle of Mariology that is accepted by all as the fundamental one. In fact, that precise point is the reason for this study. This disagreement among Mariologists does not, of itself, prevent Mariology from being a science. Thomists and Scotists differ vigorously on the fundamental principle of theology; yet few will deny that theology is a science.

Agreement among theologians, then, is not a *sine qua non,* but the other points of the definition are. Essentially, they are the same ones required by philosophers for any principle, as first delineated by Aristotle.

> "The first point from which a thing either is or comes to be or is known." St. Thomas expresses the same idea with the axiom: "A principle is that from which another proceeds in any way."[5]

To define the fundamental principle of a science, and of Mariology in particular, this concept will have to be limited a little more.

> It should, in addition, have these qualities: it must be formally revealed; it must give us an adequate definition of Mary; it must be absolutely firm, sufficiently fecund, and thus guarantee the unicity of the science of Mariology.[6]

This specifies well what the fundamental principle of Mariology should contain. There is only one criticism of it, perhaps justified, perhaps not. The author calls for the principle to be formally revealed. But what principle other than the Divine Maternity, among those which have been put forth as the fundamental principle can definitely be said to be formally revealed? Frequently we are not certain that a truth has been formally revealed until it has been defined, e.g., the Immaculate Conception. It doesn't seem true, at the pres-

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[1] E. O'Connor, C.S.C., ed., *The Dogma of the Immaculate Conception, History and Significance* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame U. Press, 1958), pp. viii*ff*.

[2] J. F. Bonnefoy, O.F.M., "L'Immaculée dans le plan divin," *Ephemerides mariologicae* 8 (1958), p. 60; translation our own.

[3] C. Vollert, S.J., "The Scientific Structure of Mariology," *Mariology* (ed. J. Carol, O.F.M.; Milwaukee: Bruce, 1957), vol. 2, pp. 1-24.

[4] J. Carol, O.F.M., *Fundamentals of Mariology* (New York: Benziger, 1956), p. 7.

[5] P. Mahoney, O.P., "Mariological Principles, Their Nature, Function, and Derivation," *Marian Studies* 10 (1959), 22-46; p. 24.

[6] M. Griffin, O.C.D., "The Divine Motherhood, the Fundamental Principle of Mariology," *Marian Studies* 10 (1959), 104-20; p. 106.

ent time, that either the Co-Redemption or the Predestination of Mary have been defined as being formally revealed, although a few theologians consider them to have been defined.

A NECESSARY SCIENCE?

Since we are accepting St. Thomas' definition of *principle* we must find some fault with those authors who would seem by their definitions to make Mariology a *necessary* science. There is a science of Mariology because Mary was the Mother of God, but she did not have to be. "God could have created the body of the human nature of Christ without the instrumentality of a mother."[7] The fact that she was the Mother of God (or any other fact that may be taken as a basic principle) is marvelous, and is undoubtedly related to all other prerogatives, but that all others can or should be deducible from it is a mistake. Thus, it seems to us that authors who say they are looking for "a fundamental truth from which the other doctrines relative to her logically *flow*"[8] or "an organic system of truths logically deduced from one or more principles revealed to us by God,"[9] are looking in vain.

There is much room for study but little room for deduction here. As Laurentin has said, "Everything can be connected with the mystery of the Blessed Virgin's maternity, practically nothing can be deduced from it."[10]

Again, if we are to have one science of Mariology we must have one and only one fundamental principle. If it were duplex, it would seem to indicate two sciences; if it were complex, you would have the science already within the principle, just to be deduced, which is impossible, if the first principle is a contingent fact. We are only trying to make the facts intelligible, not necessarily deduce them from one another. As Fr. Vollert explains, the theologian "will find in a single basic truth of revelation the principle of intelligibility that imparts unity, clarity and cohesion to Mariology."[11]

Having decided that Mariology is or can be treated as a science, we can proceed to examine the many opinions on the fundamental principle of that science, in the light of which all other Marian prerogatives become more intelligible, and to which they are related.

OPINIONS ON THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE

Until quite recently, there was not very much dispute as to which was the basic prerogative of Our Lady, to which all her other prerogatives were to be related. Since the time of Ephesus and before, the Church has delighted in crying with the Ephesians, *"Hágia María, Theotókos!"* Later, however, and especially in our own day, theologians have not spared themselves in delving into the study of the Mystical Body of Christ. There is no doubt that Mary received the magnificent privilege of Divine Maternity, of becoming the Mother of Christ. But today they wish to know what is her relationship to Christ's Mystical Body. For many, their viewpoint or emphasis in regard to the Mystical Body of Christ will determine what is the fundamental principle of Mariology.

For the majority of Marian scholars the recent emphasis on Christ's Mystical Body does not present much of a problem. By a close study of the concept of the Divine Maternity, with all that it implies, they find that it is the sufficient and necessary fundamental principle of their science. Mary is the mother of the Redeemer; therefore she has a special function in the Redemption, and a special relationship to the redeemed. Mary is the Mother of Christ, of His physical and Mystical Body; therefore she has a special relationship to the Church. Mary is the only one with rights over her Son which she may relinquish; therefore she is the Co-Redemptrix. These and other considerations lead many to find the fundamental principle of her science in her Divine Maternity. This widespread opinion is mentioned cursorily here, only to make the survey of opinions complete. It will be dealt with in more detail later.

The second strongest opinion among Marian scholars sees the fundamental principle as being Our Lady's role as Co-Redemptrix. In this office only, they maintain, we clearly perceive the fullness of her relationship to God and man. From this role we learn that she became Mother of God in order that the Redemption might be accomplished by her Son, and in a lesser degree, by her cooperation with Him. And it is also from this that we perceive her spiritual relationship to men. This, then, is more fundamental than her Maternity and is to be taken as the basic principle of Mariology, the one that sheds the maximum light on all the other prerogatives.[12] This, they maintain, is by no means a new opinion, but the very same held by so many Fathers when treating of the Mary-Eve parallel.[13] They would submit that to take the Divine Maternity as the starting point is to neglect the purpose for which Christ came into the world, *to redeem us.*

> How then could we speak of the Blessed Virgin in isolation? Her person, her mission, her destiny will be unintelligible (and the function of Mariology is to make her more intelligible) except in reference to Christ and His work of Salvation.[14]

It is evident that this school does not limit itself to Mary's personal redemption *sublimiori modo,* nor even to her cooperation as Mediatrix of all grace in the application of Christ's merits to individual souls. Both of these are in the realm of *subjective* redemption. They understand that God willed to *accept* her offering in union with that of their Son in the *objective* redemption. Her part was not necessary in any way, but she helped, solely because God willed, in the redemption of the human race, and this, they maintain, is the fundamental principle of Mariology.

The most serious criticism against this position is that it seems to neglect the Maternity and make it sec-

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[7] P. Mahoney, O.P., *art. cit.,* p. 29.

[8] F. Connell, C.Ss.R., "Toward a Systematic Treatment of Mariology," *Marian Studies* 1 (1950), 56-66; p. 60.

[9] L. Everett, C.Ss.R., "The Nexus between Mary's Co-Redemptive Role and Her Other Prerogatives," *Marian Studies* 2 (1951), 129-52; p. 133.

[10] R. Laurentin, "Le mouvement mariologique à travers le monde," *La vie spirituelle* 86 (1952), p. 183; cited by Vollert, *art. cit.,* p. 14.

[11] C. Vollert, S.J., "The Fundamental Principle of Mariology," *Mariology* (ed. J. Carol, O.F.M.; Milwaukee: Bruce, 1957), vol. 2, p. 37.

[12] L. Everett, C.Ss.R., *art. cit.,* p. 129.

[13] L. J. Riley, "Historical Conspectus of the Doctrine of Mary's Co-Redemption," *Marian Studies* 2 (1951), 27-106; p. 30.

[14] C. Journet, "Sacred Scripture and the Immaculate Conception, a Problem in the Evolution of Dogma," *The Dogma of the Immaculate Conception* (ed. E. O'Connor, C.S.C.; Notre Dame: Notre Dame U. Press, 1958), p. 17.

ondary. Also, it does not grasp fully what the Divine Maternity means, since a full understanding of it would seem to make this position superfluous. The fact is that God could have chosen anyone as co-redeemer,[15] but if Mary is Co-Redemptrix it is due to the fact that she had maternal rights to relinquish, to offer. Under what other title would she have such rights?[16] She is then, according to the critics of this opinion, Co-Redemptrix becauses she is Christ's Mother, and not the other way around.

For the two former opinions, there is but *one* fundamental principle of Mariology. Other scholars, believing that neither opinion alone is capable of providing the basis for the science, candidly admit that two basic principles are necessary. With some, the problem is not so simple; they prefer to make the two into one. Upon analysis, however, the unity is usually only verbal, with two principles remaining.

Both opinions of Roschini, and the one of Scheeben fit into this classification. The first opinion that Roschini held was that " 'Mary is Mother of God and associate of the Mediator.' From these two truths . . . all the conclusions of Mariology can be inferred."[17] His later position is that Mary is the Mother of the Whole Christ, and this is the fundamental principle of Mariology.[18] However, since the title Mother as applied to Mary in regard to Christ (by nature) and to us (by grace) is analogous, and not univocal, we again have two principles. Scheeben, with his theory of *Bridal Maternity,* does not seem to differ in essentials from either of Roschini's opinions.[19] He attempts to unite Mary's chief roles, indicating the New Eve by the word "Bridal" and the Divine Mother by "Maternity."

The chief criticism of these theories is that they multiply fundamental principles without need. Many times, unfortunately, this is done because the authors seem to think that the science must be completely and implicitly contained in the fundamental principle, and their role is merely to unfold it. The same is true of the principles that follow, which are simple statements of rather complex principles.

Semelroth, seeking to place Our Lady in the middle of the economy of salvation, since "the basic principle of Mariology must be that mystery which, while conferring unity on the science, is also the point at which it is inserted in the whole of theology,"[20] makes that principle the fact that Mary is the prototype of the Church. Upon examination we find that this principle seems to be Scheeben's in new terminology, and hence the same criticism of the disadvantages of a double principle can be leveled against it.

A rather novel opinion is that of Mueller, holding that Mary's *fullness of grace* is the basic principle.

> God has only one plan of salvation and has established only one order of Grace. The grace is essentially ordained to the Divine Maternity which is realized where grace is perfect, in Mary. Therefore, Mother of God simply means 'Full of Grace.'[21]

This lies open to some very serious criticism which the author himself admits. Since Christ has more grace than Mary, He should be His own Mother!! He seems to forget the infinite distinction between Justification by *gratia creata* and Incarnation of *Gratia Increata.*

Other theories include the rather poetic one that would make Our Lady the New Paradise (Congar[22]) and that of Karl Rahner,[23] *the Perfect Redemption of Mary,* which is widely rejected as being superfluous since it only emphasizes the purely passive role of Our Lady in the Redemption.

> Mary is wholly in each of her privileges (declares Fr. Guérard de Lauriners, O.P.,) such wise that you cannot grasp any one of them adequately without grasping all the others in Mary herself.[24]

This may explain in part the diversity of opinions on the subject, but if we are to have a science of Mariology, one of those privileges must be seen to be more basic than all the others, to be able to shed more light on them than they shed on it. One is inclined to agree with Fr. Everett:

> Analyzing the variety of teaching on the fundamental principle of Mariology, we find among all of them, with the exception of the first (Divine Maternity) and third (Mary, the New Eve) that the difference is verbal rather than real.[25]

Hence, now we will try to show that the traditionally accepted principle of the Divine Maternity when understood in its fullness is more apt than any of the above to be the fundamental principle of Mariology. Following that, we will indicate what further distinctions seem to be called for in the framework of a Franciscan theological synthesis.

THE DIVINE MATERNITY

The majority of theologians do not have much of a problem in determining the fundamental principle of Mariology. For them, there are so many indications that it is the Divine Maternity that they hesitate not at all in affirming it. All of theology seems to point in that direction in regard to Our Lady.

> The over-all purpose of creation is the external glory of God to which is ordained in its turn, the redemption of mankind through the Incarnation of the Word. To this the Divine Maternity is ordered and all the other Marian privileges in turn are ordered to Mary's motherhood.[26]

Nor is this the opinion of isolated theologians. All through the ages the belief of the Church has pointed in this direction.

> This is the concept (*Theotókos*) on which the infallible *sensus Ecclesiae* has pondered, and from which all of Mary's privileges are deduced, not by frail arguments of fittingness, but by a genuine unveiling and unfolding.[27]

Fr. Journet uses the word 'deduced' with which there can be some argument, but it would be very difficult to prove that he has erred in his emphasis on the Divine Maternity. Where is that *sensus Ecclesiae* more manifest than in the prayer life of the Church? And what concept, if not the maternity, has consistently, and from the earliest ages been the basis of that prayer life? "Sub tuum praesidium confugimus, Sancta Dei Genetrix!" "Hágia María Theotókos!" This is especially good as an indication in Mariology because, as Fr. Eugene Burke points out,[28] there is more *lex*

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[15] C. Vollert, S.J., "The Fundamental Principle . . .,"
[16] L. Everett, *art. cit.,* p. 129.
[17] C. Vollert, S.J., "The Fundamental Principle . . .," p. 51.
[18] *Ibid,* p. 57. [19] *Ibid,* p. 52. [20] *Ibid,* p. 60.
[21] *Ibid,* p. 65. [22] *Ibid,* p. 67. [23] *Ibid.,* p. 69.
[24] O'Connor, *op cit.,* p. x.
[25] L. Everett, C. Ss.R., *art. cit.,* p. 134.
[26] P. Mahoney, O.P., *art. cit.,* p. 29.
[27] C. Journet, *art. cit.,* p. 19.

orandi-lex credendi in this tract than any other. It was to the prayer life of the Church that the Popes pointed as indications of the belief of the Church when they defined the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption.

The Magisterium, although making no solemn statements on the subject, does seem to lean toward the same view. Pius XII says that the Divine Maternity is "an office than which nothing greater can be imagined."[29] Of course, the Popes have frequently spoken in glowing terms of one or other of the prerogatives of Our Lady, so that they could probably be quoted in favor of other opinions, but they have spoken so often and so emphatically on this particular one, that it seems difficult to believe that they would consider any other prerogative to be more fundamental.

These are a few of the indications that point to the Divine Maternity as the fundamental principle of Mariology. It remains now to see what is meant by that concept. If it can be shown that it is sufficietnly broad to include Mary's spiritual Maternity of us by means of her cooperation in the objective Redemption, there would seem to be no reason to search any further for the basic principle, much less admit two of them.

By analysis, the Maternity seems to include the Co-Redemption since God does not assign offices *by halves*. Also, since Mary is elevated to the hypostatic order because of her instrumentality (maternity) in the hypostatic union, she would by that very fact be Co-Redempritx, due to the fact that beings in that order have a redemptive function.[30]

This will depend, of course, on what God *intended* for Mary, and what she *consented* to. Was Mary made our Mother on Calvary? Or was Christ merely making explicit a fact? If the latter is true, then her co-redemptive function was not established on Calvary but was, and continued to be, one with her Maternity.

Elias de Dolorosa maintains that the Maternity includes three things: election as Mother of God, election to maternal union with the Redeemer, and election to spiritual motherhood over men.[31]

The point here, of course, is not whether the participation by Mary in the *objective* Redemption is a fact or not. The point is that if the Co-Redemption is a fact, it can be shown that it is probably implicit *in the very texts* which affirm Our Lady's Maternity, and can thus be considered one with it, as the basic principle of Mariology.

THE MATERNITY IN THE GOSPELS

To determine whether the Co-Redemption is conjoined to the Divine Maternity, we must know what Our Lady consented to. We are sure that the information we have from St. Luke is from her, since she was the only one who would be able to tell him about the Annunciation, etc. She was the only eye-witness, and it was precisely what impressed her that she told Luke.[32] We cannot suppose that there was any doubt in her own mind that remained unanswered, since, with the one "doubt" that she had, she showed that she was disturbed and asked a further explanation. Just examining the scene of the Annunciation we find that "Mary consented to become through God's action the Virgin Mother of a Child, who is the Messiah, who is Yahweh, God Himself."[33]

Did she know that this child was to be the Saviour, the Redeemer of mankind? Certainly, she must have known at least as much as the shepherds, and to them it was announced that Christ was their Saviour.[34] What did she know about the Saviour that was expected by the Jews? There is every reason to suppose that, as the most pious of Jews, she knew the Messianic prophecies of the Old Testament. She must have known the fifty-third chapter of Isaias, where he speaks of the Christ being "bruised for our offenses." It would seem that she knew that she would become the mother of a suffering Saviour.

This was the Son, then, to whom she would have a physical relationship upon uttering her *fiat*. But would it only be physical? That is difficult to believe. Christ doesn't seem to believe it.

> On two occasions when His own Mother was receiving special deference precisely because of her human, carnal relationship with himself, Jesus felt obliged to rectify the outlook of His followers.[35]

The passages in question are Lk. 11:28 and Mt. 12:50. In the latter especially we hear Mary praised more for doing the will of His Father than for her carnal relationship to Him. At the Annunciation she learned what the will of God would be for herself and her Son, and at various times during her life she is praised for fully accepting that will. It was the will of God that He be offered: doing the will of God perfectly, she joined in that offering.

These indications are by no means conclusive or definite, but they do seem to show that if we are looking for the Co-Redemption in Scripture, certain texts can be interpreted in favor of it, but they are also the very ones that prove Mary's Divine Maternity. It would appear from such an interpretation that by God's will and her acceptance she was the worthy Mother of the Redeemer: thus, by one act of the will, this one person was both mother and co-redemptrix. If these two concepts were once so united they may be again so united, making the fact that Mary is the worthy Mother of the Redeemer, the fundamental principle of Mariology.

> All that (Mary's prerogatives) was given to her so that she should be the Mother of God and because *thus* she was to fulfill a unique role in the redemption of the world.[36]

Up to this point we have examined Mary's role as it began at Nazareth and continues even up to the present. God, however, is eternal. May we not reach further precision and riches by delving into the mysteries of the eternal plan which He had for His Christ?

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[28] E. Burke, C.S.P., "The Beginnings of a Scientific Mariology," *Marian Studies* 1 (1950), 117-37; p. 117.

[29] Pius XII, "Fulgens Corona," *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 45 (1953), p. 580. The same idea is found in (among other places) the "Lux Veritatis" of Pius XI, A.A.S. 23 (1931), p. 513.

[30] C. Vollert, S.J., "The Fundamental Principle . . .," p. 80.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

[32] R. Kugelman, C.P., "The Object of Mary's Consent in the Annunciation," *Marian Studies* 11 (1960), 60-84; p. 61.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 83.

[34] Lk. 2:11.

[35] R. Mercurio, C.P., "Some Difficult Marian Passages in the Gospels," *Marian Studies* 11 (1960), 104-22; p. 121.

[36] Pius XII, "Address to World Union of Feminine Catholic Organizations," *A.A.S.* 49 (1957), p. 912; italics mine.

> When we ask how necessary Mary was to the plan of God we cannot answer until we have found out what part Christ played in that plan. Whatever is predicated about the predestination of Christ is applicable, *debitis servandis*, to Mary.[37]

For many, the fact that they have found Our Lady as the worthy Mother of the Redeemer, or simply the Mother of God, answers these questions sufficiently. Others feel that the problem has not yet been solved.

> A compact and unified Marian treatise has not yet been constructed, because the fundamental principle of Mariology has not been correctly assigned. Until we transcend the limits of Mariology itself and penetrate to the center of the history of Salvation, we shall not apprehend the basic principle regulating Marian Theology.[38]

Theologians, then, must first of all answer the question of Our Lord, "What think you of Christ?" For those who envisage the eternal plan as simply the Redemption of the human race, this article has tried to give the principle of Mariology which for them would be basic, Mary's Redemptive Maternity. There are many, however, who hold a *more precise* principle for all of theology, and this reflects (or should reflect) on their teachings on Our Lady.

Bonnefoy is probably one of the most famous and insistent theologians of the Absolute Primacy and Predestination of Christ. He is perhaps more of a Scotist than Scotus, but he has reached admirable precision in the theology of the *Predestination*. Although he denies that there is a science of Our Lady, we do not think that this necessarily follows from his synthesis on the Absolute Primacy of Christ. If he admitted such a science, it would seem that the Predestination of Mary as the *Alma Socia Christi* (a title so often used by Pius XII) would be the fundamental principle.

> In order for the future Christ to be able to know the higher joy of making other people happy, God decrees, then, the call to existence of another creature, to whom the future Christ will give eminent supernatural gifts, above all the privilege of participating in the divine life by a supernatural grace. She will unite in herself "a fullness of sanctity and innocence such as under God one cannot imagine a greater, and such as with the exception of God, no one can understand the greatness of them." (Ineffabilis Deus, Pius IX)
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> * * *
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> God decides that Mary, in exchange for the gifts she will receive from the future Christ, will give to Him his holy humanity: she will be the mother according to nature of Him to whom she will owe her call into existence and her super-eminent grace: *O admirabile commercium!*[39]

Thus, for Bonnefoy, the fundamental principle for the study of Our Lady is the absolute predestination of Mary, in the same decree as Christ, to be the *Alma Socia Christi*. It is to this that all her other prerogatives, including her Maternity, are to be related. This is truly a bold and ambitious concept, yet one that is arrived at by rigorous logic, and one that can solve a good many of the problems of Mariology.

> When fitted in Bonnefoy's theological system, this doctrine (Co-Redemption) takes on a completely new aspect which may well turn out to be of surprising value to Mariology. Indeed, the gravest difficulty advanced by some against this doctrine (namely that Mary was herself redeemed: hence she could not be a co-redemptrix) vanishes into thin air when viewed in the light of this alluring conception.[40]

All theologians who hold the Christo-centric theory do not agree with Bonnefoy on every point. It seems that for most of them Mary is primarily predestined to the Divine Maternity. Pope Pius XII emphasized this in a sermon he gave as Cardinal Secretary of State in 1937:

> Eternally, the material world appeared to Him (God the Father) as the palace of Christ, our Head; the angels and men as His servants; Christ Himself as the Son and royal Prince; and you, O Virgin, as the most worthy Mother of His Son, God's Mother: *Sancta Maria, Mater Dei*.[41]

The same thesis of absolute predestination of Mary to the Divine Maternity is defended by St. Francis de Sales,[42] Plassmann, O.F.M.,[43] Balic, O.F.M.,[44] along with most of the other theologians who hold the absolute Primacy and Predestination of Christ.

But no matter what may be the object of that predestination of Mary, it seems that the concept of her predestination must precede any of her other prerogatives as the *fundamentum* of her relation to God. If one wishes to make her predestination as the Mother of the Saviour the fundamental principle, well and good; but unless that *predestination* is included, we do not think we have her in the proper perspective, especially in Franciscan theology.

We are well aware that acceptance of such a fundamental principle in Mariology has vast repercussions on all of theology. It could not logically be accepted by one who does not hold the Absolute Primacy of her Son. But developments in Mariology have brought about a re-examination of all theology. Perhaps the felicitous advantages of her predestination in relation to her Son as the fundamental principle of Mariology will lead to the wide acceptance of the Absolute Predestination of Our Lord. "Principles are not demonstrated; either they are seen or they are missed."[45] It is difficult to 'demonstrate' the Primacy of Christ, but perhaps the continued study of Mariology will lead scholars to 'see' it, to the greater glory of God, for which Mary and her Son were predestined.

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[37] W. F. Allen, "The Predestination of Mary in the Light of Modern Controversy," *Marian Studies* 2 (1951), 178-92; pp. 178-79.

[38] C. Vollert, S.J., "The Mary-Church Analogy in Its Relationship to the Fundamental Principle of Mariology," *Marian Studies* 9 (1958), 107-28; p. 110.

[39] J. F. Bonnefoy, O.F.M., *art. cit.*, pp. 26-27; translation our own.

[40] J. Carol, O.F.M., "Recent Literature on Mary's Assumption," *American Ecclesiastical Review* 120 (1949), p. 381.

[41] *L'Osservatore Romano*, Dec. 8, 1937; tr. in D. Unger, O.F.M., Cap., "Select Questions on the Final Cause of the Incarnation," *Franciscan Approach to Theology* (Franciscan Educational Conference, vol. 38 [Washington: Capuchin College, 1958]), 46-76; p. 60.

[42] St. Francis de Sales, *Treatise on the Love of God*, Bk. 2, ch. 4 (tr. H. B. Mackey, O.S.B.; Westminster: Newman, 1942), pp. 73-77.

[43] T. Plassmann, O.F.M., "Uno eodemque decreto," *Virgo Immaculata* (Acta Congressus Mariologici-Mariani; Romae, 1954) 8, pp. 174-97; cf. *idem, Radiant Crown of Glory* (New York: Benziger, 1954), pp. 3-14.

[44] C. Balic, O.F.M., *Praefatio ad vol. 3, Alma Socia Christi* (1950), pp. v-vii.

[45] C. Journet, *art. cit.*, p. 25.

ALCOHOLISM: A MORAL STUDY

by Bonaventure J. O'Brien, O.F.M.

It is known that there are certain impediments to the *voluntarium,* that is, to our deliberate free will acts. The question, in each case, is: To what degree is the freedom of the will diminished by the influence of the impediments, or do the impediments destroy the freedom of the will completely? All admit that alcohol interferes with the spiritual faculties of intellect and will. But, the basic problem is to find general norms in order to determine the degree to which alcohol influences man's free acts.

ALCOHOLISM

First of all, what is alcoholism? It has been defined as a chronic disease; as a disorder of the personality; as a psychological or physiological disorder; as a psychosomatic disorder; and, as an addiction.[1] The common denominator in these definitions is that alcoholism is a disorder, a disease. But the disease is not one whose nature is solely physical, solely mental, or solely behavioral. The basis for this statement lies in the fact that man is not simply body, for in man there are two principles organized as a unit. Man is not a complete being, indeed, not a man, if limited to a soul or body alone. Further, because man is a unit (an unum per se), there is an interaction between his soul and his body. St. Thomas acknowledges this interaction when he suggests bathing the body to assuage pain and sorrow.[2] With this in mind it is plausible to see how alcoholism can be both a psychic disorder with ramifications in the body, and a physical disorder with overtones in the soul.



The interaction within man's unity is seen in the descriptive definition of Seldon Bacon, a sociologist at the Yale School of Alcohol Studies in New Haven, Connecticut. He states, that

> Alcoholism is a condition appearing in adult individuals which may be labeled a disease. It is characterized by: (1) the developing and eventually chronic, compulsion to drink alcohol, the need for it being based on the individuals increasing inability to meet ordinary life problems without a prop; (2) a series of responses while drinking, . . . which are not experienced, or rarely experienced, by the non-alcoholic; e.g., blackouts, sneaking drinks, specific guilt reactions, solitary drinking, . . . tremors, and morning after drinking; (3) a psychological state of pain (often concealed) and insecurity, in addition to wide range of socially undesirable reaction patterns briefly described as immature and egocentric; (4) increasing social maladjustments (obvious to all) in all aspects of life: job, family (parental), marriage, neighbors, friends, and also in most activities and attitudes; (5) accompanying diseases or damages (not always present); these are usually related only to the physiological action of alcohol in indirect fashion, but are directly related to the physiological action of the chronic inebriate; e.g., inadequate diet, irregular and insufficient sleep, accidents, etc.[3]

This definition evidences alcoholism as a malignant growth which affects all the levels of man's life—social, psychological, physiological, and spiritual. Precisely because alcoholism deviates from and disrupts the order of the whole man, it is considered a disease.[4]

How is this disease manifested? What is its fundamental symptom? Is it excessive drinking? Blackouts? Such may be the case, but one cannot conclusively determine that a man is an alcoholic because he drinks excessively or occasionally "blackouts." These are significant symptoms; but, they are not the primary symptom of the disease. It may be safely said that a man is an alcoholic when he has a compulsion to drink: ". . . the loss of control or the craving for alcohol has been considered the main addictive feature or the fundamental symptom of alcoholism as a disease."[5] It is significant to note that "the compulsion is not directed specifically at alcohol but at intoxication, it is a desire for those affects which alcohol produces."[6] This desire attempts to remedy the imbalance due to psychological or physiological disturbances.

Need this imbalance manifest itself as alcoholism? Not necessarily, for the choice of alcohol depends on the immediate environment. If alcohol is more available than drugs, the choice will probably be alcohol; if drugs or other means are more available, the choice will often be these.

The essential problem both in the treatment of the alcoholic and in assessing his moral imputability is to lay bare this compulsive craving. To do this, the processes, conditions, and factors involved in the de-

[1] Mark Keller, "Definition of Alcoholism," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol,* 21 (March 1960), p. 133.

[2] *S.T.,* I[a], II[a], q. 38, a. 5 (New York: Benziger, 1947), Vol. 1, p. 756.

[3] Seldon Bacon, "The Mobilization of Community Resources for the Attack on Alcoholism," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol,* 3 (December 1947), p. 476.

[4] The American Medical Association defines a disease as follows: "In general, any deviation from a state of health; . . . a definite marked process having a characteristic train of symptoms" ("Queries and Minor Notes," *The Journal of the American Medical Association,* [May 25th, 1957]). Alcoholism is a deviation from a state of order (health), and has characteristic symptoms; therefore, it is treated as a disease in the medical sense.

[5] Gunnar Lundquist, "The Cravings for Alcohol," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol,* 16 (March 1955), p. 42.

[6] E. M. Jellinek, "The 'Craving' for Alcohol," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol,* 16 (March 1955), p. 35.

velopment of the disorder will be viewed by considering the two common types of compulsive drinkers. A distinction must be made regarding the origin of this compulsion.[7] If the origin of the craving is primarily psychological, then the drinker is classified as a primary alcoholic. If the origin of the craving is primarily physical, then the drinker is classified as a secondary alcoholic. This distinction finds its clearest application when considering incipient alcoholism. Yet, it must be noted that, from the very nature of alcoholism, this distinction becomes ever more tenuous as the alcoholism progresses.

TWO ALCOHOLICS — ONE DISEASE

(1) The primary type of compulsive drinker develops from a mainly psychological compulsion for the affects of alcohol. He is maladjusted before he starts to drink. At present, the common opinion is that there is no question of a personality maladjustment, but it is difficult to establish the predominant characteristics of this maladjustment. It seems more likely that a number of personality types have a peculiar susceptibility to alcoholism. Nonetheless, the attempted studies have produced some results; the research seems to indicate that the alcoholic is a highly dependent and egocentric personality. For example, at the Alcoholism Research Foundation of Ontario it was observed that traits of domination and mothering were consistently found in the wives of alcoholics.[8] Further, a study reported by Wittman described the alcoholic as having ". . . a definitely expressed and disproportionately greater love for the maternal parent." [9] These reports seem to indicate a dependent personality.

Another study, in the field of perception, suggests egocentricity as a keynote in the alcoholic personality: ". . . the alcoholics had difficulty when they had to identify or locate objects unrelated to their own body structure or position, although they were able to do reasonably well on those tests where their own body or self position was involved. It suggested that this was consistent with the type of personality in which there is high awareness of self, amounting to preoccupation which tends to exclude sensitivity in relationships outside of or not directly bearing on the self."[10]

It is reasonable to believe that if the ego figure or dependence figure were threatened a state of anxiety would result; as the threat increases the maladjustment becomes increasingly harder to bear. "If such persons are, like most Americans, introduced to the custom of drinking, and if anxieties about drinking are not too great and no other way out of their dilemma is found, then they are likely candidates to start on the road to alcoholism." [11] "This development illustrates the conception that for the type of person described alcohol is an *adjustment*." [12] A vicious circle begins: drinking causes new life problems. In order to relieve these problems the person turns to his new solution of alcohol. This causes more guilt; to soothe the guilt he uses more alcohol. The circle continues until he is caught by alcohol.

The primarily psychological craving is seen here. A person has in the beginning no physical need for alcohol. He needs to feel different, and the best way is by intoxication. It is the exhilaration, not the alcohol that he craves.

(2) The secondary type [13] of alcoholic develops from a more physical craving than the psychological need of the primary alcoholic. He is usually considered normal before his initial drinking. An alcoholic of this type tends to be more extroverted. He may be the leader in the group, the excessive practical joker, or the most aggressive salesman. The implication is that he has to work harder than others to achieve a sense of personal adequacy, of being a significant member of the group. He usually belongs to a heavy drinking group; however, in the beginning, he is in control of his drinking. Gradually a process sets in which is called the pampering effect of alcohol.

This pampering leads to two reactions: (A) positive: gradually alcohol lowers the sensitivity, the discrimination, the control, and the efficiency of the drinker. Unless counteracting forces arise, it allows the drinker less adequate stimulus responses; he will follow personal inclination rather than accepted social demands. (B) Negative: the personality of the drinker takes on a new form; he becomes more self-conscious, cynical, and suspicious of others. He becomes increasingly isolated and self-centered. Slowly, he takes on the characteristics of the primary type. This is only superficial and must be kept in mind when treating or, in our case, when assessing imputability.

A knowledge of the alcoholic's drinking history is the chief means of finding the category to which he belongs. Questions such as: when did he begin to drink? How long after his initial drinking did the craving develop? When did he begin to drink in the morning *after a night of drinking?* When did blackouts appear? The length of time between the initial drinking and the manifestations of the symptoms of alcoholism is of prime importance here. Symptoms include such things as: the loss of control after a few drinks, the craving for drink, the presence of life problems due to drinking, and a progressive dependence on alcohol. If the time gap is relatively short he would probably tend toward the primary type.

MORAL IMPUTABILITY

With this information, one may try to discern the moral imputability of an alcoholic. In doing this, the division of compulsive drinkers into primary and secondary will be continued. This is not only a fundamental clarification, but also an essential distinction for assessing the responsibility of an alcoholic.

The primary alcoholic is considered maladjusted before he starts to drink. He uses alcohol as the chief means for adaptation in the discomforting conflict arising from psychological pressures. Now, because he is maladjusted before his initial drinking, because the

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[7] This distinction is developed from Seldon Bacon, "Alcoholism: Nature of the Problem: Its Extent, Therapy and Prevention," *Federal Probation*, 11 (1947), p. 7.

[8] John D. Armstrong, "The Search for the Alcoholic Personality," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 315 (January 1958), p. 42.

[9] P. Wittman, "Developmental Characteristics and Personalities of Chronic Alcoholics," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 34 (1939), p. 361-377.

[10] Armstrong, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

[11] Bacon, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 8 (Emphasis added).

[13] The analysis herein presented is basically that of Bacon, *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

primarily psychological compulsion enters almost immediately after his initial drinking, and because his evaluative cognition regarding alcohol will necessarily be effected by his maladjustment, it can be concluded that responsibility is lessened according to the degree of maladjustment and consequent compulsion. In some cases the act of the will may be completely absent; this will depend on the degree of maladjustment before his initial drinking.

The secondary alcoholic is usually normal before he starts to drink, and the compulsion enters after a period (varying with individuals) of excessive drinking. Objectively, he is responsible for his condition, since he is responsible for the free acts leading to the condition. However, as far as his subjective guilt is concerned, it must be remembered that the alcoholic does not usually consider himself as an alcoholic, and therefore, will not *foresee* his condition of addiction. He may recognize his deviant drinking habits, but, the fact of his tending towards a state of addiction is often not realized. The alcoholic masters the defense mechanisms of projection, rationalization, and denial of reality—he *believes* his wife, not his drinking, is responsible for the separation; the police, not his drinking, are responsible for his confinement; the employer, not his drinking, is responsible for his lost job. He believes, in the early stages of his disorder, that he can control his intake of alcohol, In determining his subjective guilt, these facts should be taken into consideration; he may not *foresee* his coming addiction, therefore his guilt for the state alcohol induces upon him, may be diminished, or completely absent.

PROGRESSIVE DRINKING — ALCOHOLISM

The aspects, both moral and scientific, of what might be called alcoholic drinking will now be considered. Alcoholic drinking is a progressive condition. Its course may be rapid or slow depending on the type of alcoholism. Usually, alcoholics begin with a period of relatively controlled drinking. Sometimes in their career they may have experienced a few blackouts during drunkenness; they may have started sneaking a few drinks more than their companions. After a while it happens that on occasions when they only intended to drink lightly they ended up drunk. They may have developed a need to rationalize their heavy drinking. Solitary drinking, morning drinking, and intense drinking bouts begin to appear as a regular practice. By this time the stage of alcoholism has been achieved, but it may not be recognized by the individual. Attempts at control or at changing the pattern of drinking may follow. Feelings of remorse become persistent. The individual becomes socially isolated. He may develop deep anxieties, tremors, and fevers. By now he is recognized by all, perhaps even by himself, as an alcoholic. Some may take only three years, others may take fifteen years, to reach the undoubted stage of alcoholism.[14]

The degree of culpability for alcoholic drinking lies in the interference of compulsion with the executory power, that is, with the act of the will. It is again understood that the individual's subjective responsibility is being considered, not the objective morality of drunkenness.

A clear distinction should be made between the craving, on the one hand, which draws a man on, almost physically, to the continuation of drinking *during* a bout, and the compulsion, on the other hand, which leads a man from the completion of one bout to the beginning of another.[15]

When alcohol is withdrawn from an alcoholic once he is in the actual drinking bout, or rather toward the end of it, he develops symptoms which point toward a physiological craving for alcohol. This is suggested for the following reasons: (1) the symptoms constitute a definite pattern which varies no more than would be expected in the case of any biological reaction; (2) many of the symptoms and signs are not usually associated with psychological patterns; e.g., fevers, convulsions, and tremors. The appearance of many of these phenomena are correlated in time with a decline in blood-alcohol concentration following the cessation of drinking.[16] The alcoholic drinks to restore the balance in his body. Consequently, during a drinking bout, the drinking could possibly continue with little control, without his will, or against his will.

The compulsion, on the other hand, which leads from the completion of one bout to the beginning of another, is postulated as being chiefly psychological in origin.[17] No question of the reality of the craving exists; the problem debated is about the basic factors involved in the compulsion. The compulsion is considered psychological because: (1) the "physical craving for alcohol . . . does not persist indefinitely after cessation of drinking. After a few days or weeks of abstinence, the alcoholic . . . is physiologically indistinguishable from his fellows. He has no craving in the physical sense, yet he relapses and drinks to excess again;"[18] and (2) ". . . no amount of treatment by the administration of various substances which either cause sedation, or relieve bodily discomfort . . . prevents the recurrence of later bouts."[19] Reasons given for this psychological compulsion vary with different theories of psychiatry. At present, none of the psychiatric formulations can be proved in the strictly scientific sense.[20] The only common denominator is that some personality defect does exist and that the alcoholic drinks as one means of handling the symptoms arising from the personality disorder. If we add to this his confused state of despair, self-hate, anxiety, and resentment, also, a possible inability to form an evaluative cognition, the presence of moral responsibility could be greatly diminished, or completely absent.

The alcoholic will have his individual problems, his individual personality, and his individual degree of compulsion. However, these considerations should incline us toward the view of Fr. John Ford, S.J., that ". . . the responsibility of the average alcoholic for his drinking is notably diminished, especially after he has had a few drinks; that our judgment of his sins should incline toward leniency; and that there are a great many

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[14] This description is derived entirely from E. M. Jellinek, "Phases in the Drinking History of Alcoholics. Analysis of a survey conducted by the *Grapevine*, Official Organ of Alcoholics Anonymous," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, 7 (June 1946), pp. 1-88.

[15] Jellinek, "The 'Craving' for Alcohol," *op. cit.*, p. 36.

[16] Harris Isabell, "Craving for Alcohol," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, 16 (March 1955), p. 39.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 40.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 40.

[19] Jellinek, "The 'Craving' for Alcohol," *op. cit.*, p. 36.

[20] Isabell, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

cases where he is not mortally guilty of becoming drunk." [21]

A pertinent comment has been made by Fr. Joseph S. Duhanel, S.J., who stated, in reference to irresistable impulses and compulsions, that:

> When we say that the impulse to avoid an intolerable situation may be irresistible, we do not mean that the intolerable pain envisaged constitute an objective excusing cause and that it is therefore permitted to freely yield to the impulse. We are dealing with the negative principles of the natural law which admit no excusing cause. We are not therefore espousing the principles of 'Situational Ethics.' The obligation to strive against the impulse remains despite the fact that it involves intolerable pain. What we mean is that in such a situation it is sometimes no longer physically possible to resist. The action takes place on the level of an *actus hominis: this is the compulsive action and irresistible impulse.*[22]

SINFUL EXTERNAL ACTS

The alcoholic's responsibility for acts while he is in a state of intoxication is further complicated by blackouts, that is, temporary losses of memory during the drinking bout. Therefore, a two-fold consideration will be made: (1) external actions committed after the loss of control; and (2) external actions committed after the loss of control, but during a blackout.

(1) *External actions committed after the loss of control.* With regard to these actions, it must be said that if the drunkenness is purposely produced in order to commit a sinful act, the alcoholic is culpable for that act. The drunkenness serves as a means for the accomplishment of the sinful act; he who wills the means wills the end.[23] Likewise, if he foresees that certain sinful actions, e.g., sins of impurity or neglect, will result from his drinking although he does not intend them in themselves, they are imputed to him if he voluntarily posits their cause, drinking. But, it is possible that he may not voluntarily posit the cause, i.e., his drunkenness; thus, his responsibility for these actions would be diminished or even taken away. Perhaps he intends to take only a few drinks, but, then, not realizing his lack of control, he continues to drink to drunkenness.

Responsibility is reduced if reason is taken away in part. The fact that a man is an alcoholic does not mean he is totally without the use of reason. The use of reason may be totally impeded only after some time; or he may never completely lose it. In such a case he could place either a perfect or imperfect voluntary act dpending on the amount of deliberation of the mind.[24]

(2) *External actions committed after loss of control, but during a blackout.* A blackout is not passing out, nor drinking until one falls asleep. It is a temporary loss of memory, not a total loss of consciousness. It is similar to amnesia; the drinker remembers nothing after the blackout the evening before. It means a loss of memory with regard to a certain period of time caused by excessive drinking. It is possible during a blackout to be rational; however, this rationality is thought to be superficial. The man appears rational, but is actually in a state of confusion, or lacks full consciousness. Therefore, since a man is morally responsible only for rational and willfull acts, the moral imputability is in accord with his degree of rationality. He could be responsible in so far as he placed the cause; but, moral responsibility in this case would depend on whether he foresaw the result: sinful acts.[25]

REHABILITATION

To examine all that is entailed in rehabilitation would be a task of mammoth proportions. The point in question here, however, is moral responsibility. The alcoholic, once he *realizes* his condition and is *convinced* of the possibility of a cure,[26] would be gravely culpable were he to make no effort to change his condition.[27] This culpability could be modified by ignorance, despair, and confusion. Does he realize he is an alcoholic? Is he conscious of his moral obligations?

His desire for a cure centers around motivation. Generally, he will fall into one of three groups, sometimes changing from group to group, even within the period of one day. He may react to his illness and its attendant suffering with a strong desire to be cured. On the other hand, he may resign himself to all the difficulties, pains, destructions, and sufferings of his illness. Finally, he may find certain compensations and advantages in his illness called secondary gains.[28] These secondary gains would be escape from the stress of life, relief from personal inhibitions, and the attainment of a sense of omnipotence. Beneath it all, two forces are at work: the desire to change and get well, is opposed by a desire to continue uncontrolled drinking and retain the "benefits" of alcohol. Which force gains control depends on the sensitive individual and the circumstances peculiar to his environment.

In the first part of this paper a distinction was made between primary and secondary compulsive drinkers. These two types appear to be the same in the final stages of alcoholism. The distinction is to be achieved by analysis of the drinking history, the social history, and the emotional status and development of the alcoholic. For some types of primary drinkers the therapeutic results are *not* particularly encouraging; and prolonged psychotherapy is often needed; temporary separation from the patients' ordinary milieu may be called for. For the secondary type, intensive psychiatric work may not be necessary; institutionalization, unless other complications are involved, is probably unnecessary, perhaps unwise; counseling, social re-orientation, or psychological re-training are more likely to be suggested; his progress is usually good.[29] Hence, it seems that rehabilitation for the secondary type is more easily effected than for the primary type. This factor should be reckoned with in assessing moral responsibility for a cure.

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[21] John Ford, S.J., "Depth Psychology, Morality, and Alcoholism," *Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America,* (1950), p. 133.

[22] Joseph S. Duhamel, S.J. and Jerome Hayden, O.S.B., "Theological and Psychiatric Aspects of Habitual Sin," *Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America,* (1956), p. 139. Emphasis added.

[23] Noldin-Schmitt, *Summa Theologiae Moralis* (Oeniponte: Rauch, 1957), I, n. 43, 5.

[24] *Ibid.*, n. 43, 2.

[25] The section dealing with external actions, both during a blackout and in the absence of one, is based on John Ford, S.J. and Gerald Kelly, S.J., *Contemporary Moral Theology* (Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1958), I, p. 295 ff.

[26] By the term "cure" is meant that he may adopt to a situation, adjust to a normal life; but he can never drink again, not even in moderation.

[27] Ford and Kelly, *op. cit.*, p. 295.

[28] Sidney Vogel, "An Interpretation of Medical and Psychiatric Aproaches in the Treatment of Alcoholism," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol,* 14 (December 1953), p. 627.

[29] The analysis herein presented is basically that of Bacon, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

CONCLUSION

Fr. Joseph Mangan, S.J., suggests the attitude for the priest in his relationship with the alcoholic penitent with these words:

> The priest should look on the alcoholic as a physically, mentally and spiritually sick man. He comes to us to be helped in his spiritual sickness. We must be willing to spend time with him. While with him, we must be careful not to persuade, not to push, not to nag, not to plead, not to pity, but to give understanding. We must make it clear to him, not so much by words as by the way we treat him, that he is welcome and that we are interested in him. We must point out the purpose of his life. For him we can not overemphasize the mercy of God. The alcoholic is struggling with a sense of worthlessness, rejection, lonesomeness, shame, and confusion. A deep realization of the mercy of God can be of tremendous help in counteracting these depressed thoughts. The priest can help to remove the alcoholic's objective sense of guilt, relieve him of his sense of guilt, and help him to prepare to make amends for the past failures. But in the final analysis, the measure of our personal success with him will be proportionate to the sympathy, understanding, kindness, and love that we put into our work. The priest should consider himself a part of a cooperative team working to help the alcoholic understand himself and achieve sobriety. The immediate therapeutic goal of every member of the team is the same: to help this individual not to take the *first* drink—ever! The priest who understands a little about alcoholism and a lot about the need of the alcoholic for sympathetic help can offer important assistance in the achievement of this goal.[30]

[30] Joseph Mangan, S.J., "Helping the Alcoholic," *The Catholic Mind,* 56 (1958), pp. 149-150.

IN OUR TRADITION—Cont'd fr. pg. 3

ence in the past as being man-centered and materialistic, and he contrasted this with the confidence that:

> The new age of science gazing out into God's clear space instead of back into our own murky psychological depths, may let fresh air into modern thought . . . this mood is more likely to prove theocentric, rather than narrowly 'humanistic' in any man-centered, materialistic sense. It is the mood in which a new Saint Bonaventure or Scotus could talk to us of a Christocentric universe.

How would this technological movement appear to the Scotist as he elaborates on the Franciscan vision? To him, Christ is pre-eminent, the Beginning, the Final Cause, the Primate and King of the Universe. "He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature. For in Him were created all things. . . . All things have been created through Him, and He is before all creatures, and in Him all things hold together" (Col.I: 15-18).

Christ, therefore, is center, the principle of unity of a creation that is incomprehensible without Him. Everything in creation was made through Him as its meritorious efficient cause. Since creation is the work of a single plan of Wisdom, all things are pointed to Christ for termination and meaning. This orientation to Christ is the dynamic tendency in matter urging it to become what it was intended to be from all eternity.

Whether one speaks of a universe in evolution or a creation capable of expansion through its potentiality, our technology can be understood as an instrument in that development. In a creation that is unfinished, man as a technician has a role to play in its developing, and as a Christian he has the task of extending to the universe the effects of the Incarnation. As a collaborator in creation, he perfects; as a protractor of the Incarnation, he divinizes and restores—drawing all things to recapitulation in Christ. Man's tools and his power, his nature and his grace, are brought to bear on created things and thereby created things come to share in the promised fulfillment of a new creation.

But man's salvation is not necessarily effected by the perfection of creation. True human development is in the "supra-nature" of man, and its fulfillment can be accomplished only through grace. A transformed world can only be the environment in which God's gift of Grace might abound the more. Man's earthly labor will constitute a means of sanctification only insofar as it makes him more truly human—when Christ is the measure of what is human. Man must use his talents and his creative power to make the forces of the physical world the instruments of his freedom. This freedom will in turn serve to bring out the relation between the individual and Christ, and man will then transcend an existence centered upon himself and physical things to one centered upon God.

This freedom can be achieved by the total Christian dedication to transform the world while paradoxically maintaining a certain diffidence towards it. To be committed to the development of the seminal possibilities latent in matter can reduce man to a place of subservience to material demands. On the other hand, to divorce himself completely from the work of co-creation and development of God's universe is unrealistic for a modern man. Saint Francis again exemplifies for us a Christian life in the world. Francis practiced a positive asceticism to prevent his own fallen nature from seducing him to an inordinate love of the creatures he rejoiced in. Prayer, proper humility, the spirit of poverty, plus an all embracing Christo-centric vision—all these must be exercised if the individual is to be free to attain to God and to draw all things with him. He will have true power over creation and he will possess a restraint in exploiting his technological achievements only when his spiritual vision is articulated in mature moral control. Thus the advances of our age have dramatized in bold relief the need for moral excellence. This was the means used by Francis to attain his concord with nature; it is the technique of modern man's attainment of God through the world. This is the modern adaptation of that same balanced discipline that enabled Saint Paul to say:

> I know how to live humbly and I know how to live in abundance (I have been schooled in every condition), to be filled and to be hungry, to have abundance and to suffer want. I can do all things in Him who strengthens me (Phil. 4: 12-13).

Thus, to interpret material progress in terms of Christ-centered cosmic development, is not only valid but even essential. Only when God pre-empts in the minds of men the place He deserves, will technology be understood as a means of sharing in the act of creation. The significance of technology in this light, would not be in terms of material development alone, but in terms of man's personal orientation to Christ—a conformity that would say to man, all things are yours, "and you are Christ's, and Christ is God's" (I Cor. 3, 23).

Book Reviews

Theology of the Mystical Body **by Emile Mersch, S.J.; tr. Cyril Vollert, S.J.; New York: Herder, 1958; 663 pp., $7.50**

In his first book, *The Whole Christ,* Fr. Emile Mersch showed how Scripture and the Fathers explain the nature of the Mystical Body in their general treatment of dogma. It was a doctrinal exposition, serving as the necessary groundwork for a speculative synthesis which would focus all creation, all doctrine, on Christ.

Before going into further detail on the contents of this latter work, *Theology of the Mystical Body,* it would be wise to clear up a possible preliminary misconception. Although the work is of a theoretical nature, this by no means removes it from the realm of the practical. To divorce theory from practice as falling into its own exclusive realm is to fall into, or is the result of, the Cartesian error. If something is true theoretically, it must have practical ramifications. Christ said He is the way, the truth, and the life. He is the life because He is the truth. Being the truth, He is the way. So too, St. Francis used to say that a man knows only insofar as he does.

Fr. Mersch was struck with a vision, at times one surmises that it was the intuitive vision of St. Paul, seeing Christ as the all in all, for Fr. Mersch succeeds in showing how Christ is the truth and how we can see Him in the truth and the truth in Him. Being concerned with the truth, the work necessarily identifies the way and the life, so that the reader enters upon the scene, bent upon noting the immediate practical significance of this masterpiece of synthesis.

What does it mean to know Christ? It means to know Who God is and who we are—truths contained in Christ. The author further relates how the entire universe is contained in Christ and reflects Him, so that we can know it fully only by knowing Christ fully. Christ is the First Intelligible Principle of all things, and therefore the unity of theology.

The chapters of this work are based upon this principle. Knowing Christ, we know ourselves, we know about the universe, we see the damage of original sin, we consider Mary. All this is seen as a preparation for the Incarnation, presented as the truth which will set man free, meaning that all his struggles and longings are solved and fulfilled—and only understandable in Christ. From here, we turn to the Redemption, the revelation of Christ, the Trinity, the Church, and grace. In one massive sweep, the reader is brought to the realization of the utter intrinsic dependence of all creation, tending for its completion towards Christ Who alone gives it meaning.

Included in this study is an excellent ontological discourse on the Mystical Body, retaining and actually proposing each member's individual personality, not as a fiber or a cell, nor as an indistinct, formless entity. Insights into the "attitude" of Christianity are obtained by recognizing it as filial in character, since it is joined to Christ. The grace of union is filial, and this is the principle producing the grace of Christ known in theology, which is therefore also filial. This manifests itself in an attitude of filial dependence upon God, the humility of a son relying upon his father. The consciousness of Christ is also an illuminating topic. Fr. Mersch is prompted to consider this by the words of St. Paul: "Let this mind be in you which was in Christ Jesus" (Phil. 2:5), as well as by the purpose of his work. Profound conclusions result—Christians must be "verbal," or "verbified," as St. Athanasius said:

> Their divinized life and existence must be oriented toward understanding and reflection, a life that reaches its summit in an interior expression that shares, in a way suitable for members, in the expression of the Word by the Father in their head (p. 402).

The words of Christ, revelation cast into formulas, are the

> . . . sensible manifestation of the substantial revelation that is Christ, the incarnate Word . . . spirit and life, not because they are syllables and sounds, but because they are the outer, corporeal aspect of the life that communicates itself interiorly, the life of Christ, light of light who sheds light over those who belong to Him (p. 413).

The imitation of Christ takes on a deeper meaning for us:

> In His sacred humanity Christ was a living revelation of the Trinity, not

BOOKS RECEIVED

The Word of God by Georges Auzou; tr. Josefa Thornton; Herder Co. 1960; 255 pp., $4.75

Lenten Meditations by David Greenstock; Bruce, 1961; 155 pp., $2.50

With Anxious Care by Felix D. Duffy, C.S.C.; Herder Co., 1961; 121 pp., $2.75

The Sunday Gospels by Richard T. A. Murphy, O.P.; Bruce, 1960; 264 pp., $5.00

A Tour of the Summa by Paul J. Glenn; Herder Co., 1960; 456 pp., $5.00

The Sacrament of Freedom by John B. Sheerin, C.S.P.; Bruce, 1961; 159 pp., $3.50

Hearing Confessions by Dom Desmond Schlegel; Newman Press, 1960; 32 pp., $.75

To Live is Christ by R. W. Gleason, S.J.; Sheed and Ward, 1961; 180 pp., $3.00

Newman the Theologian by J. H. Walgrave, O.P.; Sheed and Ward, 1960; 378 pp., $8.50

Eucharistic Sacrifice and the Reformation by Francis Clark, S.J.; Newman Press, 1961; 582 pp., $7.50

Father Faber by Ronald Chapman; Newman Press, 1961; 374 pp., $5.95

The Life of the Mystical Body by Philip L. Hanley, O.P.; Newman Press, 1961; 378 pp., $4.95

An Introductory Bibliography for the Study of Scripture by George S. Glanzman, S.J. and Joseph A. Fitzmeyer, S.J.; Newman Press, 1961; 135 pp., $1.50

only by His words, but by His very being, His slightest gestures, and even His manner of speaking and acting. In Christ and through Him, the same must be true of Christians. They will reveal the Trinity, assuredly, by repeating the sacred formulas that come to them from Christ and the Church, but also by their mode of life and action, by all that they are (p. 413).

In view of this, the Gospel assumes a new significance, for in it Christ's way of acting is fully portrayed. He becomes, in the fullest sense, the way, so that the "little way" of spiritual childhood is recognized, not merely as a pious exhortation, but as a "psychological and ontological adaptation to the message brought by the Son" (p. 414).

This work provides a brilliant dogmatic and ascetical compendium of theology, serving as a solid foundation upon which to build one's entire spiritual life. We get a glimpse of Christ in all reality, His Human Nature opening the Trinity to us, coming through as a ray of light enveloping, penetrating, vitalizing all things. The role of the Holy Spirit is clarified: "God's work, after the Fall and even before, is summed up in Christ the Son, and . . . it consists in bringing the whole of creation to the Father, in the Son through the Spirit" (p. 415).

The synthesis is Bonaventurean in scope, for it brings all knowledge to the service of uniting man with God. The one flaw in this beautifully conceived and written book is in reality its chief merit. The reader wants further insights into applying this greatest of all knowledge to his daily activity. This is the challenge to the reader, for he prolongs this book by living it, reflecting upon it, making it his own. As Fr. Mersch would say, the Christian must perpetuate revelation, "continue Christ."

For the beginner in theology, the work gives the true significance of the perennial problems. Why do we consider them? In the light of Christ, the reason for it all. It is handy for the student midway through his studies, for it reorients his outlook, preventing him from getting lost in speculative problems for the sake of speculation itself. For one who has completed his studies, it will serve to renew his love for theology, seeing it as the presentation of truths coming from Christ, understandable only in view of, and in, Christ, Who is the doctrine Himself.

Theology of the Mystical Body is a tribute to the spirit of Fr. Mersch himself who, through it and through his saintly life at Louvain, which ended while administering to the victims of a bombing raid in Douai, has perpetuated revelation by his incorporation into Christ. By actuating these truths, we Christians become continuators of Christ. Zeal for Him and knowledge of Him necessarily go hand in hand. This, I think, is the author's final message which he proves very successfully.

VICTOR F. GUARINO, O.F.M.

***The Conversion of Augustine* by Romano Guardini; tr. Elinor Briefs; The Newman Press, 1960; 258 pp., $3.95**

In a work at once informative and inspiring, Monsignor Guardini again demonstrated his genius for a clear, compact delineation of a man and his life. "To reveal Augustine as the struggling, growing Christian endeavoring to understand himself in faith," (p. xviii) is the aim of *The Conversion of Augustine*, an aim which is admirably achieved. The value of this book rests in the fact that it places many of the basic, formative thoughts of Augustine into the integrated picture of his spiritual development. The first part of the book is a limpid exposition of these forces—confession, the memory, mind, sensuality, spirit, and heart—showing them to be an essential element in St. Augustine's conversion. The second part of the book deals with a chronological account and commentary on this conversion.

The word "conversion" in the title should be understood in the sense of *metanoia*—a reorientation of one's whole being, a permanent shift in position, a deep self involvement with everlasting repercussions. From this vantage point this book succeeds in accurately depicting the fierce struggle with spirit and body that Augustine experienced. The author affords us deep insights into this struggle by his manner of treating the key concepts alluded to above. Monsignor Guardini not only serves up the ideas in question, but also tones and colors them until they achieve life and direction in the ebb and flow of Augustine towards Catholic Christianity. What results is not a work about Augustine nor an abstract manual of Augustinian thought, it is Augustine himself, leaping out, catching our mind and heart, plunging us into his innermost depths, almost forcing us to follow the tortuous route of his turning to God. Hence, one does not merely assimilate new facts or achieve pleasant insights from this work—far more faithful to the message of this work is the impulse to go apart for awhile and examine one's own approach to God.

The Conversion of Augustine has something to offer to the *initiate*. For those acquainted with Augustinian thought, the first part will be refreshing and rewarding. For the newcomer to the *Confessions* this book will competently serve as a thoughtful introduction. The translator, Elinor Briefs, is to be commended for a superlative job in giving us a work so eminently readable that we are scarcely aware that it was originally written in German.

VINCENT DE PAUL CUSHING, O.F.M.

***The Four Gospels: An Historic Introduction* by Lucien Cerfaux; tr. Patrick Hepburne—Scott; Newman Press, 1960; 145 pp., $3.00**

It is the solitary boast of Christianity that its Revelation and Mysteries rest on irrefutable historical fact. What causes consternation to the rationalist and agnostic is not so much the Church's teaching of the Resurrection as the historical fact of the Resurrection. In this small but compact book, Mgr. Cerfaux examines and reaffirms the historical character of the Gospels from the viewpoint of their origin, development, and final formulation. His approach is a welcome one—an unbiased, objective, and critical study of the understanding and attitude of the primitive Christian Community toward its pearl of great price: the Gospels. Conspicuously absent throughout the book is the well-worn polemical and apologetic reaction to the 19th Century critics.

The author is positive and forward-looking in his attempt to reconstruct for 20th Century Christianity just how and why the Gospels have taken the form they have. The opening chapter, "The Good News and the Apostolic Tradition," is the key to understanding the remainder of the book. In this chapter Fr. Cerfaux emphasizes the deep and lasting influence that the oral tradition of the "Good News" exerted in the formation of the Gospels, particularly the Synoptics.

The many miraculous incidents recounted by the Evangelists which appear to us as very short, stripped down, and reduced to their essential points were shaped by their oral sources. "The actual reality must have been complicated, as it always is, the story has 'set' into its simplest version . . . such in substance is our gospel material: material of an oral tradition, easy to remember, reduced to bare essentials" (p. 11). Oral tradition is an austere censor of detail; word of mouth and memory retain only the salient features of an event. Mnemonic techniques, repetitious, and rhythmic meter which are the instinctive form of the spoken word appear even in the written word of the Gospels. The author citing Lk. 1:1, suggests that a "prehistory," consisting of mixed oral and written tradition, preceded the final fixing of the canonical Gospels. This "prehistory" eventually resolved into two main series of sources: 1) the first series covers the activity of Jesus in Galilee, 2) the other series is a consecutive narrative beginning with the first warning of the Passion at Caesarea Philippi and terminating with the Passion and Resurrection. This forking of the "Good News" into these two fundamental sources has impressed itself upon all subsequent literary tradition.

The remaining chapters of this study are devoted to the construction, arrangement, and development of the Gospels in their historical setting, literary forms, and their powerful influence on early Christian piety. Noteworthy is the penetrating analysis of St. Luke's addition of new and richer source material in his Gospel. St. Luke has included not only the traditional witness of the twelve but also the witness of the 72 disciples. It

is to the witness of the 72 and the women of Galilee that we owe the tender and moving parables of God's merciful love —The Good Samaritan and The Prodigal Son. In discovering the scrupulous fidelity and care with which the Apostolic Fathers and early Christians handed on the "Good News," we clearly realize that the Christ of Faith *is* the Christ of History. The Gospels are the foundation of the Church's Faith, not vice-versa.

Mgr. Cerfaux has again produced another scriptural work of outstanding scholarship. By tracing the origin, spread, and development of the *Evangelium* from the moment it burst upon the world from the Galilean hillsides until its final crystallization in the four canonical Gospels, the author has given us a fine conspectus and introduction to the multifarious historical problems of the Gospels. At the same time this little book is accompanied by an equally sound and scholarly approach to their solution. Aside from a too literal translation in some chapters and a few awkward grammatical construction, the translation by Patrick Hepburne-Scott is adequate. This is a book recommended both for the cleric engaged in formal studies of the scriptures and the educated layman who is desirous of inquiring into the foundations of his Faith.

ROBERT R. MONAHAN, O.F.M.

***Morality and Modern Warfare: The State of the Question* edited by William J. Nagle; Helicon Press, 1960; 148 pp., $3.95**

On a recent college examination, one student replied to a thought provoking question: "This is a problem that I prefer to leave with my elders until I'm old enough to hand it on to my children." This seems to be the prevalent attitude on the problem of *nuclear warfare* and its moral implications. Both major powers profess that the next war will be nuclear. Since that war is not yet with us, we find it convenient to take an ostrich attitude regarding the morality involved.

However, actual war is but the culmination of a long period of political and military maneuvering. *Policy* is formulated long in advance. The moral principles that dictate the conduct of war are the same principles that shape the policies that lead to it. Therefore, we must re-examine our present nuclear diplomacy in the light of sound moral principles.

Catholic thought is conspicuously late in making its appearance in this field. *Morality and Modern Warfare* is not just timely—it is long overdue. It is a small (148 pages) but powerful collection of essays which represent diverse opinions on the subject. Modern warfare and nuclear policy are complex, and knowledge of nuclear physics, military policy, political science, sociology, and theology is required before a prudent moral judgment can be made. Eminent Catholics in all these fields have contributed to this book, and have thus made a significant contribution to the studies of, so called, nuclear morality.

Would we be morally justified in using nuclear weapons under any or all conditions? What could we do if New York City were bombed? This volume, *Morality and Modern Warfare,* helps us to formulate an answer. It is indeed distressing to hear of immoral and amoral solutions to the nuclear problems, and it is even more alarming to learn that high officials have not even taken pains to form their conscience on the question. If we are to remain Christian, our morality cannot rest upon emotional or cloudy thinking; it must be formed by clear objective principles drawn from the natural law. That is why this book meets a desperate need.

Thomas E. Murray, formerly a member of the Atomic Energy Commission, has stated in his essay, "Morality and Security: The Forgotten Equation," that:

> The fatal error we are presently in danger of making is that of allowing weapons to dictate policy. The danger is really twofold—first, that we allow weapons technology to control the weapons program; and second, that we allow the stockpiled results of the weapons program to control military policies with regard to the use of the stockpile. To succumb to these related dangers would be to turn the whole of U.S. policy upside down (p. 63).

We are stockpiling megaton bombs, capable of obliterating a fifty mile area, with little consideration for the fact that their use could be morally justified in an extremely limited number of situations.

At the other extreme we find the pacifists position eloquently enunciated by Dr. Gordon Zahn. He outlines and defends his convictions of Christian Pacificism in his consideration of "Social Science and the Theology of War." If the other essays are informative, Dr. Zahn's is the most thought provoking. Certainly it is not a position to be dismissed as gross ignorance of the principle of double effect. It is conceivable that we might arrive at a point where there is no other solution, as Fr. John Ford, S.J., lucidly states in the conclusion of his article:

> The threat of atheistic communism presents us with terrifying problems. But I think these problems are entirely oversimplified when reduced to the stark dilemma: either wipe them out or be wiped out yourselves. But if that were the dilemma I would consider that we had arrived at the point where absolute moral imperatives were at stake, and the followers of Christ should abandon themselves totally to divine Providence rather than forsake these imperatives (p. 103).

There is no room in this matter for a "no opinion" attitude. This is a vital question that intimately involves the future of Western civilization, of our country, of ourselves. If war began tomorrow and everyone adopted what Dr. Zahn calls the "Pilate" attitude—"I consent but I'm innocent"—we would be no less guilty of our crime than the Roman Procurator was of his.

The purpose of this book is to remove the vacuum of "no opinion," and to bring the problem into sharp focus. This symposium does not answer questions, but it does contribute to their formulation. The editor, Dr. William J. Nagle, should be congratulated for bringing together the conclusions of so many outstanding Catholic scholars.

STEPHEN C. DOYLE, O.F.M.

***Your Other Self* by Canon Jean Vieujean; tr. Richard E. Cross; The Newman Press, 1959; 165 pp., $3.00**

Here is a book which is at once simple and practical: simple because it treats of love; practical because the love discussed involves you, your neighbor, and God. In a style direct and unadorned, the author leaves love *in abstracto* for the ivory-tower and takes love *in concreto* for his subject.

> To love all men in general and to love enemies who are absent is very easy. But to love those who are very close, who continually disturb and upset our peace of mind, without even being aware of it; to put up with their faults without a word, the faults that always irritate us in the same spot, like a perpetual nail in the shoe; . . . . to be still even when they disturb the recollection we need so badly, and rob us of our time for prayer . . . this is the inglorious heroism that is daily required of love! (p. 33).

Canon Vieujean's treatment of love is primarily Augustinian; he treats of all the virtues under the aspect of Charity. For him, the virtues are different ways of expressing love—to God and to our neighbor, our other self. How often we have read St. Paul's definition of Charity; yet, how often we find it difficult to put that Charity into practice. How is Charity patient, kind, not puffed up, etc.? The answer lies in living Charity, and Canon Vieujean offers us the way. In his book, patience, humility, justice, etc., are presented to us in the light of a practical charity. By constantly using down-to-earth stories, the author not only illustrates the close union between Charity and each virtue; but also, he gives concrete reminders on how this Charity should be practiced.

The book contains twenty-eight chapters, each less than ten pages. On each page you see yourself in a mirror, a new mirror; also you look through a window to see your neighbor, your other self.

There is something else, however, that charity takes for granted other than this discovery of the concrete reality of a human person. More exactly, charity goes beyond it; it plunges deeper into this reality. It penetrates as far as the hidden mystery of the being before it. And this mystery is God: the real presence of God in this person (p. 11).

* * *

The love we bear toward our neighbor is a little like the love we have for God. It maintains itself and deepens only through composure, meditation, disinterested attention and self-renouncement (p. 28).

The author gives an informative and humorous list of how "Some people, more than others, have the knack of trying our patience (p. 109)." He briefly describes each type: the bores, the time-wasters, the windbags, those with a one-track mind, etc. However, after seeing how our neighbor can try *our* patience, the author closes the list by saying: "Then let us humbly call to mind that *we* too . . .! (p. 110).

Another value in the book is that we see ourselves as others see us; a viewpoint we seldom exercise.

When someone knocks at our door and we answer 'Come in,' is it always a welcoming and engaging tone, or is it the impatient tone of a man who is disturbed in the midst of his occupation?

* * *

When we pick up the receiver and say 'Hello!' does it mean, 'You are welcome, sir,' or is it, as our hearers must interpret it, 'Oh, what a bore! You always call at the wrong time!' (p. 59).

The author does not stop at mere analysis of the reader, but puts that self-knowledge into action. We see where we are failing in charity, and the author quickly points out what we are to do about it.

All of us at sometime have to enter a hotel, a hospital, or a factory. Don't pass by the doorman as if he were a dog in a kennel! Even if you have no need of his services, give him a little sign of friendship and say 'good day' to him with a smile . . . He is a man just like you and he needs this. It will warm his heart. He will thank you more for that than for your tip (pp. 55-56).

One reason why this book is so refreshing is the style: you feel that he is not only talking with you, but thinking with you, discussing the various ways of practicing charity.

The mystery of someone's presence! It is not always necessary to do or say something to make someone happy or comfort him. Besides, it is not always possible. It is enough to *be there* . . . to be present with all your powers of sympathy and affection (p. 144).

Just exactly what this means is made evident throughout the book; for instance, in the chapter entitled, "The Power of a Smile," the author says: "A smile! Charity costing nothing save the will to keep my soul open to all, ready to welcome all! (p. 63)."

In the opening pages of this book, the author makes evident the necessity of writing on the need for a true understanding and practical application of Charity. The apostolate of every Christian whether priest, religious, or layman, is to bring Charity into the market place and so win souls to Christ. But such an apostolate will be wholly ineffective if it has not the life of Charity. The purpose of this book is to show us how this can be done, how it must be done, if our apostolate is to be effective and win souls for Christ. Whether our apostolate is individual, person to person; or general, an organized group to individuals, the apostolate will fail if Charity is not its soul.

The apostolate ought to be the incarnation of a pure love of neighbor, the manifestation of a living Charity. . . . The soul of the apostolate is charity, sincere love of God and man. . . . Without the apostolate of love, the apostolate of propaganda is emptied of its life's blood (p. 155).

* * *

We cannot love our neighbor for our own advantage, nor for that of a faction, country, religion, or church. We must love our neighbor because he is himself. We must love him in himself and in the One who is more present in him than he himself is: God. Such is Our Lord's command (p. 165).

The thoughts in this book are simple, yet penetrating. The book could be skimmed through in a day, but it would profit nothing. This book should be read slowly; it was meant to be pondered upon.

FRANCIS XAVIER MILES, O.F.M.

John Courtney Murray, S.J., *We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition*. (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960; 336 pp., $5.00

Father Murray seems, as the title of his book indicates, to do two things. He gives his answer to the question: what are the fundamental truths on which our American society and form of government are based? For him, our society is a unique historical reality, badly in need of a re-evaluation formed from basic truths summed up in the opening words of the Declaration of Independence. He then reflects upon the American Catholic's understanding and acceptance of American tradition in his unique pluralist environment. The book substantially consists of papers previously written by Father Murray for various scholarly journals. Skillfully edited, the book shows an unexpected unity for such a collection, giving evidence of the author's fundamental unity of approach and treatment in his previous writings.

This work is divided into three parts. In the first part, he treats of the overall American experiment in its unique, pluralist setting. He then goes on in the second part to appraise what he considers four key questions in the political order which as yet remain unanswered: government aid to religion in education, censorship, the development of a true Christian Humanism and the structure of freedom. Finally he considers the question of the formulation of a public philosophy for the present-day political questions. In each of these problems, Father Murray attempts to show under what conditions the situation is understandable and acceptable to the Catholic, and how the Catholic thinker or the Catholic community might help to solve them.

Concerning the book as a whole, of special interest is Father Murray's suggestion for a new approach to the argument for a public consensus, that is, an awareness and acceptance of certain basic truths by all Americans. We might begin, he says, by asking the question: "Do we or do we not need a public Philosophy?" He goes on to point out:

To argue the question in this form I would recur to the truth that lies at the heart of the philosophical error of pragmatism. It is false to say that what works is true. But it is an altogether sound proposition that what is not true will somehow fail to work. . . . Briefly, the argument would be that if public affairs today are going badly, the basic reason is the absence of a public philosophy . . . (p. 86).

The ethical and rational origins as well as the authority of such a public philosophy, and the special role which the university might play in preserving and passing on this philosophy are then treated by the author in subsequent chapters.

While many will not readily accept all that Father Murray proposes on the four key questions mentioned above, all will admire, I am sure, the clear and unbiased way he pursues these difficult questions. Especially laudable is the analysis of two variant tendencies in the development of Catholic thought. Father Murray gives these two variants the titles of "terrestrial" and "eschatological" humanism. One is struck by the thought that a sincere effort by these two camps of Catholic thinkers to establish a genuine "dialogue" might catalyze the forming of that "ever precarious synthesis known as a Christian Humanism."

Of even greater relevance to our present situation is Father Murray's insight into the fundamental error of the modern man. In traditional thought men have always recognized the role of the Church, as a perfect society, to check the abuses of the other perfect society, the State. However, in the modern man's rejection of this function of the Church, is seen a betrayal of the whole structure of true freedom.

The question has always been that of identifying the limiting norm that will check the encroachments of secular power and preserve these sacred immunities. Western civilization first found this norm in the pregnant principle, the freedom of the Church (p. 204).

This is why, the author concludes, an

understanding and defense of this principle is essential to the very structure of human freedom.

The final portion of this work is, in my opinion, disappointing. Aside from the excellent treatment of some particular problems, there seems to be little here of relevance to the basic politico-moral question—that of formulating a public philosophy. He touches upon this problem, it is true, when he states:

> From the point of view of the problem of war and morality the same need appears that has been described elsewhere in what concerns the more general problem of politics and morality. I mean the need of a far more vigorous cultivation of politic-moral science, with close attention to the enormous impact of technological developments on the moral order as well as on the political order.
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> * * *
>
> It is public policy in all its varied concretions that must be "moralized" (to use an abused word in its good sense). This is the primary need of the moment. For myself, I am not confident that it is being met . . . (p. 273).

Having stated the problem so clearly, it is hard to see just what Father Murray proposes outside of the call for a true, rational "dialogue" between interested parties. If such conversation can at best lead us back to the affirmation of the dictates of the tradition of natural law, as I think Father Murray himself suggests, would it not be more beneficial for the Catholic community to put forth this doctrine from the start in a terminology adapted to our age? In the words of our late Holy Father Pope Pius XII:

> This is not the time for assigning new aims and objectives. In substance, both the principles and the objectives are well known and firmly established, because they have been taught by Jesus Christ Himself, they have been clarified and worked out by the Church in the course of the centuries, and adapted to the immediate circumstances by recent popes; they need only one thing, and that is to be put into actual practice. (Pius XII, *Dal Nostro cuore,* Feb. 10, 1952).

Should not this very doctrine be offered by Catholics as the only possible common ground of truth upon which any real "dialogue" must be built?

The value of this book should be readily evident. For the cursory reader, it will supply a clear insight into many problems of the politico-moral order now under discussion, and which are sure to be even more debated in the years ahead. To the more serious student of the political and the politico-moral problems of our society, it will provide a valuable reference for understanding these questions, especially as they are being argued within the Catholic community itself. But even more, it is hoped, it will provide a stimulus for the increased consideration of these problems by theologians and politicians alike. It is in this that the hope for a clear and successful answer to these crucial questions now facing our civilization are sure to be found.

MATHIAS F. DOYLE, O.F.M.

***The Meaning of Grace* by Charles Journet; tr. A. V. Littledale; P.J. Kennedy & Sons, 1960; 127 pp., $3.50**

A wise professor once gave me excellent advice: "when you finish a tract in dogmatic theology in the classroom and after you have studied and mastered, as far as you are able, that particular wonder of God's revelation, then meditate upon it with love, retreat to the silence of your room and in your own words and with concrete illustrations write a series of essays on the subject you have been privileged to encounter. The writing will be for you a proof of your comprehension and the means for you to share the 'secrets' of the Living God." In *The Meaning of Grace* Abbé Charles Journet presents a splendid example of how best to carry out the sage instruction of that interested professor.

The Meaning of Grace is divided into two main parts: the essence of grace and the existential states of grace. In the first section of this valuable book there are precise explanations of all the basic concepts which are necessary for a true understanding of the meaning of grace in itself or in its essence. Such basic concepts include: habitual grace, which the author speaks of as that "special love by which God elevated the rational creature above the conditions of his nature, clothes him as if with a new nature, brings him into a new universe" (p. 7); the divine indwelling for "along with itself grace brings its very source, the Trinity in its entirety, just as the sun itself is given to us in one of its rays" (p. 7); actual grace and the profound and vexing problem of God's action and man's, the relationship of grace and freedom; the doctrine of predestination presented as "a scriptural doctrine, a part of revelation, which we are to believe without doubting" (p. 35); the Church's teaching on justification, the dispositions required for justification, merit, and the consciousness of the state of grace. Each of the above points are lucidly explained in a crisp, simple and clear style.

The second section of *The Meaning of Grace* concerns itself with the existential states of grace. Abbé Journet wisely elucidates the *existential* side of grace to bring out to contemporary man the actual but diverse "realizations of grace . . . in the course of the different ages of mankind" (p. 71). He distinguishes five existential states of grace: the state of Adam in paradise; grace under the law of nature and the Mosaic law; the grace of Christ; the grace of the Church and the sacraments; and, lastly, the beautifying and transfiguring grace of heaven. In this section of his book Abbé Journet demonstrates how God's grace has been made available and is eminently available today to each and every man.

To my mind, this book's most significant feature is the abundance of concrete illustrations and graphic images which, like the deft blows of a chisel, carve out the meaning of grace with powerful expression. Abbé Journet, professor of dogmatic theology at the major seminary of Fribourg, Switzerland, is an artist as well as an outstanding theologian. His is the rare gift of teaching as an artist teaches. Following the lead of St. Thomas, Abbé Journet observes that there are examples in the natural order which, carried to the extreme, enable us to begin to understand the unmerited elevation of man to the supernatural intimacy of the divine life: "The vegetative life, for instance, lifts up a plant or a tree towards the sky, instead of abandoning it to the law of gravity. . . . Can God, then, not take over man too, with his reason, to make him gravitate round him? We have to admit that he can. He remains man, but attracted and invited to enter the orbit of a supernatural life" (p.9).

Though Abbé Journet gives little attention to the Molinistic opinion on the essence of grace and no mention of the Scotistic view, his book loses none of its force or worth. *The Meaning of Grace* has much to share with all: be he professional theologian, student of theology, or inquiring layman.

FR. NOEL A. FITZPATRICK, O.F.M.

***The Resurrection, a Biblical Study* by F. X. Durrwell, C.Ss.R.; tr. Rosemary Sheed; Sheed and Ward, 1960; 371 pp., $6.00**

Of the myriad scriptural and theological studies published each year, some few deserve to be approached more with reverence than with curiosity, more in a spirit of prayerful reflection than in one of critical appraisal. Even among such books, *The Resurrection* is outstanding.

Fr. Durrwell has succeeded admirably in realizing "a synthesis which the writers of the Bible did not express and may not even fully have realized" (p. xxv). He has not so much discovered new truths as given greater unity and deeper meaning to those already known. His synthesis, carefully constructed by a thoroughly competent exegesis of numerous well-selected texts of the New Testament, is built around the Resurrection considered as the central aspect of Soteriology. In several instances, however, Fr. Durrwell transcends the limits of Soteriology properly so-called and soars to the very summit of Johannine and Pauline Christology.

The book seems to be divided into three more or less distinct parts.

I. The first three chapters deal with the Resurrection as a Soteriological fact; i.e., they establish the relationship between the Passion and the Resurrection and between both of these and the In-

carnation. They show us that the Resurrection is not simply Christ's reward for a job well done, but the very essence and culminating point of His redemptive act; it is *in* the Resurrection, properly speaking, rather than *because* of the Passion, that we are redeemed. Fr. Durrwell's fine explanation of this fact should do much to help right the regrettable imbalance created in Western theology by St. Anselm's insistence on vicarious merit as the main aspect of the Redemption, for it shows clearly that only insofar as the Redemption has been effected within Christ's humanity as transformed by the Resurrection, and only insofar as we become united to that humanity, do we partake of the new life given Christ by the Father through the Spirit.

II. The fourth chapter, constituting a separate part in itself, more than compensates for what some may feel is a slight tendency toward anthropocentrism in the first part—i.e., a stress on what Christ means *to us*, rather than what He means in Himself and to God. This chapter, dealing *ex professo* with the effects of the Resurrection in Christ Himself, considers Him first as Lord, then as Son of God, and finally as High Priest. It paints a magnificent picture of Christ, revealing to us a God-man of cosmic dimensions, in whose very humanity the whole universe consists, yet whose theandric existence is particularly ordered to the headship of a body to which He communicates supernatural life. Christ is here portrayed as the Head and King of all creation, as the historical Figure who unites all creatures and leads them back to God and through Himself.

III. The last five chapters deal with the mystery of the Resurrection as it affects us—the Church—both in time and in eternity. Fr. Durrwell shows masterfully how the Church is contained in the risen humanity of our Lord as in her principle—how she was born, continues to live and grow, and will be consummated *in the risen Christ*. He analyzes this Christ-life in great detail, distinguishing clearly and expertly the various modes St. Paul indicates by the phrases "in the Spirit," "in Christ," and "with Christ."

This section of the book will be a gold mine for forward-looking liturgiologists and leaders of the liturgical movement; for in a real sense, as the author shows, the mystery of the Church and the liturgical year is the mystery of Easter.

The spiritual director or professor of ascetics will likewise find this section most useful in clarifying the traditional concept of the spiritual life as a death to the flesh and new life in the Spirit.

The Resurrection certainly seems to be an epoch-making book, of value for scholar and student alike, but particularly for the priest or seminarian who seeks to build his own spiritual life on the secure foundation of the risen Christ. It cannot fail to help him grow in knowledge and love of our Lord, "Who died and rose again for us" (2 Cor. 5:15).

MICHAEL D. MEILACH, O.F.M.

***Rome and the Vernacular* by Angelus A. De Marco, O.F.M.; The Newman Press, 1961; 200 pp., $3.25**

Rome and the Vernacular is an objective study based upon historical facts concerning the use of the vernacular in the Western Liturgy; it is not a polemic, nor an attempt to interpret the mind of the Church, but rather presents the matter in the context of Papal, Conciliar, and Synodal pronouncements. The publication of this historical study is both valuable and timely in view of the current discussion on the use of the vernacular in the Liturgy and its anticipated discussion in the forthcoming Council. The six chapters treat in detail the ceremonial and ritual history of the Western Rite: *The Change from Greek to Latin in the Early Church; Glagolithic as a Liturgical Language; Chinese as a Liturgical Language; Greek, Armenian, Georgian, Arabic, Syriac, Hindi, Hebrew and German as Liturgical Languages; The Council of Trent and the Problem of the Vernacular versus the Liturgical Language; The Liturgical Movement for the Use of the Vernacular versus the Liturgical Language.* Fr. Angelus brings out in luminous and abundant detail how the Church has permitted the use of the vernacular in various circumstances, especially in mission countries. Complete with alphabetical index and an up-to-date bibliography, we feel confident that this book will provide enlightening and interesting reading not only for those versed in theology, but also for the layman who wishes to be informed on this pertinent and timely subject.

Its author, Fr. Angelus De Marco, O.F.M., is a Franciscan of the Holy Name Province; he is presently Professor of Christian Archaeology, Sacred Liturgy, and Patrology at Holy Name College, the Franciscan House of Theology in Washington, D. C. Holding degrees in Sacred Music from the Pontifical Institute in Rome, in Liturgy from Notre Dame University, and in Theology from Catholic University, Fr. Angelus is well qualified to speak on this subject.

***The Works of Bonaventure: Mystical Opuscula* (Vol. 1) translated by Jose de Vinck; St. Anthony Guild Press, 1960; 266 pp., $6.00**

With this volume of the *Mystical Opuscula* of St. Bonaventure, the St. Anthony Guild Press initiates a series of translations which are planned to cover systematically all the Seraphic Doctor's major works. Volume One contains his five basic spiritual works: *The Journey of the Mind to God; The Triple Way; The Mystical Vine; The Tree of Life;* and *On The Perfection of Life: Addressed to Sisters.*

José de Vinck, a distinguished linguist and an able writer, has rendered into English the thoughts that inspired countless saints and spiritual directors. The intellectual brilliance and profound piety, the lyrical and alive expression that made St. Bonaventure a giant of the great 13th century has not been lost in the translation. Dr. de Vinck has brought to the English reader the insistent message of Love that St. Bonaventure brought to the reader of the Middle Ages.

Present throughout the volume are woodcuts reproduced from the works of Medieval masters. Some were originally single-sheet prints; others, illustrations of books published in Venice, Milan, Rome, Ulm, etc., or produced by publishers from Europe between 1482 and 1517.

The translation is based on the definitive Quaracchi Edition of the *Opera Omnia.* The St. Anthony Guild Press is now preparing five additional volumes: *The Breviloquium; Opuscula* (Second Series); *The Defense of the Mendicants; Selected Sermons;* and *Commentaries on the Rule of St. Francis.*

***Compendium of Pastoral Medicine* by Albert Niedermeyer; tr. Fulgence Buonanno, O.F.M.; Joseph F. Wagner, Inc., 1961; $7.95**

Dr. Albert Niedermeyer's *Compendium of Pastoral Medicine,* the most up-to-date and authoritative work in the field, has been made available in English by the publishing company of Joseph F. Wagner, Inc. The *Compendium* is an abstract of the essential information found in Dr. Albert Neidermeyer's exhaustive six-volume work.

No man was better equipped to produce the original German work than the eminent physician-theologian, Dr. Niedermeyer, Professor of Pastoral Medicine at the University of Vienna. Holding doctorates in the fields of medicine, philosophy, law, and sacred theology, his unusual competence earned him civic appointments as Head of the Marriage Counselling and Pregnancy Welfare Services of the Municipality of Vienna as well as Consultant for Social Hygiene.

Ideally suited for the task of translation was Fr. Fulgence Buonanno, O.F.M., Ph.D., thoroughly familiar with the work of Dr. Niedermeyer from his studies at Innsbruck University in Austria. An authority himself in the field of Pastoral Medicine, he is now Professor of Pastoral Psychology in the Fifth-year theology Program for newly ordained Franciscan priests at St. Anthony's Shrine, Boston, Mass., and Professor of Medical Ethics at St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Brighton, Mass. Fr. Buonanno has, of course, brought his English translation completely up-to-date in accord with the latest decisions of the Holy See.

No important topic in the wide field of Pastoral Medicine has escaped the scrutiny of Dr. Niedermeyer's *Compendium.* The work is divided into three parts: the first section reviews the fundamentals and principles on which Pastoral Medicine is founded; the second, treats of special problems found in Pastoral Medicine; and the concluding section contains a thorough treatment of the relationship between religion and therapeutics.

This work will surely serve the purpose of a true compendium: to be eminently useful!